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AbOuT ThIS rePOrT
This report synthesises the findings from the four country case studies produced 
for the project. It is intended as a summary introduction to the main findings of the 
research, and a preliminary comparative analysis across the four cases. Further 
analysis and more outputs, blogs, papers and books and follow-up research are 
planned. Please visit http://foodriots.org for more information. 
 
lIST OF ACrOnymS
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
CPM Community Party of India (Marxist)
Frelimo Mozambique Liberation Front
MP Member of Parliament
MDM Democratic Movement of Mozambique
NFSA National Food Security Act
PDS Public Distribution System
RMG Ready-Made Garments
RTF Right to Food 
WFP World Food Programme
WTO World Trade Organisation
We’re not fooled any more by the same old story
We’re coming out to fight the scum
The thieves
The corrupt ones
Shout along with me for this lot to get out
Shout along with me because the people have given up 
crying
(…)
This is Maputo, no one really knows how it happened
The people who yesterday were sleeping, today are 
wide awake
All because of the miserable salary you pay
The people are leaving their homes and smashing the 
first 
window they see 
Because the cost of transport has gone up
The cost of bread has gone up
 (…)
Mr President, you left the luxury of your palace
You finally noticed that life’s not easy here
Only now did you call a meeting of your Council of 
Ministers
But the people haven’t been sleeping, we came together 
a long 
time ago
We’ve barricaded the streets
We’ve halted the minibuses
No one is getting past
Even the shops are shut
If the police are violent
We’ll respond with violence
Azagaia, ‘Povo no Poder / Power to the People’, 2008 (Portuguese 
lyrics from http://www.vagalume.com.br/azagaia/povo-no-poder.
html – our translation)
Cost of livin’ gets so high,
Rich and poor they start to cry:
Now the weak must get strong;
They say, “Oh, what a tribulation!”
Them belly full, but we hungry;
A hungry mob is a angry mob.
Extract from Bob Marley and the Wailers, ‘Them Belly Full (But We 
Hungry)’, 1974, Natty Dread, Island/Tuff Gong
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SummAry
Food rights or food riots?
The green revolution and the global integration of food markets were 
supposed to relegate scarcity to the annals of history. So why did 
thousands of people in dozens of countries take to the streets when 
world food prices spiked in 2008 and 2011? Are food riots the surest 
route to securing the right to food in the 21st century?
The research synthesised here interrogates this moment of historical 
rupture in the global food system through comparative analysis of 
Bangladesh, India, Kenya and Mozambique in the period 2007-
12. This was a period of intensely volatile food prices as well as 
unusual levels of food-related popular mobilisation - unruly political 
events like riots but also more organised action like the Right to 
Food Movement in India. During the global food crisis of 2007-08 
alone, ‘food riots’ (or subsistence protests) were reported in up 
to 30 countries. In many, including the four in our study, the food 
crisis triggered changes in domestic food security arrangements. 
Did popular mobilisation effect or influence such changes? Did new 
policies and programmes institutionalise action to address hunger in 
a time when food markets have become markedly more globalised 
and volatile? What beliefs and expectations drive people on low and 
precarious incomes to protest – in the face of the possibility of violent 
repression and the challenges of organising? How do they organise 
to demand protection against food crises?
The core insight of the research is summarised in the title: Them 
Belly Full (But We Hungry) refers to the moral fury aroused by the 
knowledge that some people are thriving while – or because – others 
are going hungry. This anger rejects gross inequalities of power and 
resources as intolerable; it signals that food inequalities have a 
particularly embodied power – that food is special. Food unites and 
mobilises people to resist. 
Studying the politics of provisions in the 
21st century
There are many ways of making sense of these issues. Our approach 
was to take an actor-centred view of these events. We gained a sense 
of the scale and type of protests through media content analysis; 
conducted in-depth work with selected protest movements and 
communities to explore their motives for and means of organising; 
and reconstructed the logic of the policy response through interviews 
with policymakers and practitioners about the events of this time. 
This combination of ideas about how and why authorities should 
act, the triggers for protests, means of organising, diversity of official 
responses and previous history of results from riotous bargaining 
comprise the ‘politics of provisions’ (Bohstedt 2010; 2014). This 
multi-disciplinary approach was led by classic political sociology 
concerns about state-society relationships, but was also informed 
by other theoretical and methodological approaches. 
Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Mozambique
We selected four countries as case studies of the politics of 
provisions because their pair-wise similarities and contrasts made 
comparative analysis (in theory) possible. All have large absolute 
numbers and proportions of under-nourished, food insecure people. 
Bangladesh and India share political histories of famine, colonial 
rule and mass resistance, as well as much in the way of agricultural 
and food policy. Kenya and Mozambique are relatively poor sub-
Saharan African countries with high levels of aid dependence. The 
international media labelled Bangladesh and Mozambique as sites 
of food riots during our period, while India and Kenya both featured 
social movements and civil society activism to establish the right to 
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food to greater (India) or lesser (Kenya) extent. The global food price 
spike of 2008 hit Bangladesh, Kenya and Mozambique far harder 
than India, which is domestically self-sufficient with respect to staple 
food grains – and is the main source of rice imports for Bangladesh. 
The poorest and the low paid urban poor were hit hard in all four 
countries.
The Rumbles of The Belly
The research found that political struggles over provisioning rumble 
on in the background; the contribution of this research is to capture 
these politics at the interesting and important moment when the 
rights and responsibilities around food were under negotiation 
and contestation. Each place experienced very different political 
struggles, and yet there were similar motifs, including a repeatedly 
retold story of the superior morality of the ‘right’ to subsistence against 
the ‘right’ to profit from hunger. These movements and struggles 
can be situated within their ideological and organisational heritage 
to show that these politics of provisions are perennial struggles. 
They are not the momentary product of a price spike or period of 
price volatility, however dramatic that may have been. They are also 
deeply ideological and strategic, not the reflexive violence (wrongly) 
ascribed to the hungry. But they are also usually tacit, and often go 
unnoticed. The rumbling politics of provisions are only audible in the 
moments of crisis, and then too, usually only when crisis erupts in 
actual protests or riots about prices (or rations, etc.). Protests and 
riots are relatively rare – or rarer, at least, than levels of poverty, 
inequality and oppression might suggest should be the case. 
What we are studying here is not new, but our research is uniquely 
well timed: it is rare to be able to look so closely at these processes 
as they are in negotiation, and rarer still for the protagonists to be 
able to recall their motivations. Much of what we know about the 
politics of provisions comes from the historical analysis of food riots, 
and relies on the accounts of dead people in societies long gone. But 
in the timing of our looking at these issues, we have been granted 
unique glimpses of the domestic moral and political economies 
that bind and motivate contemporary food policies as these were 
negotiated. It has also given us some fresh ideas about what triggers 
the local eruptions that prompt re-negotiation at precisely these 
moments of global crisis. 
We started this work with the intention of answering what we 
thought was the key question at this time: did food riots – or popular 
mobilisation – increase accountability for hunger? The answer is 
a qualified ‘yes’: qualified particularly in relation to the important 
exception (and instructive example) of Kenya and with varying 
degrees of responsiveness and accountability. But we have also 
understood more about the elements of our hypothesis. ‘Yes’ does not 
mean that food riots forced policymakers into new provisions against 
hunger in the simple linear model we had originally proposed. We now 
know much more about both the popular mobilisation and the official 
repertoires of response they elicit or interact with. We now think that 
popular mobilisations around subsistence are, in the absence of 
politer channels of discontent and at a time when ‘crisis’ is the new 
normal, vital parts of a functioning machine of public accountability. 
Popular mobilisation mainly works when someone is listening and 
responding, so in a material sense, the reverse hypothesis may also 
be valid: accountability for food security causes popular mobilisation 
around food because there is no point protesting if you think there is 
no reason to expect a response. 
All of this makes sense if you accept our argument about the politics 
of food in the 21st century: that the politics of provisions are functional 
for (a minimal, negotiated degree of) food justice. Based on our 
interpretation of how people argue the rights and responsibilities 
associated with food, we conclude that the state-society relation 
is founded upon, among other things, the assurance of a minimal 
degree of food justice, a concept that captures much more than 
simply a legal right to food. It is also broader than ‘food security’ 
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precisely because it comprises both a sense of assured access 
and the more political notion of fairness. In other words, a minimal 
legitimacy of the state involves at least a moral right to access 
food. And our focus is less on the static terms of a social contract 
(which are entirely context-specific) than on the perennial dynamics 
of negotiation, affirmation and contestation required of a functional 
politics of provisions in a changing world food system. 
Our research focuses on the ruptures in those politics, at the 
moments when their functionality is no longer fit for the conditions 
(and of course, food markets are evolving fast) and/or when the 
terms of the agreement are in flux or dispute. We theorise that six 
collective, widely-held beliefs combine to create the conditions for a 
rupture in the form of a food riot or subsistence protest: 
I. We face hunger, while – or because - others profit (this makes 
the point about fairness, not just physiological hunger)
II. Food is special – nourishing our cultural and social being, 
and the single most important item of consumption (this 
emphasises the importance of quality and control over what 
we eat, and refuses a view of food as merely nutritious fuel 
for animal bodies)
III. We can live with injustice, exploitation and corruption – but 
not if they strike us in the belly
IV. We fear that this situation will deteriorate/see no sign of 
authoritative action
V. From their past performance, the public authorities have 
power and can act if so motivated
VI. We have some organisational means to express our collective 
discontent. 
Even with these conditions in place, a specific trigger tends to be 
present, a specific instance of outrage against the moral economic 
logic within which these beliefs make sense. And riots – in the sense 
of violent outbursts – tend to occur when protests are met with 
violence. 
When we say we detect a connection, a causal link between 
popular mobilisation and food policies that are reliable and fair, we 
are not saying that policymakers design policies to keep rioters 
happy. Of course this does sometimes happen, but the effects are 
typically short-lived and weak (for instance, the bungled attempt 
at subsidising unga maize meal in Kenya, the similarly failed effort 
to issue subsidised rice through outlets in garments factories in 
Bangladesh, or the promise of a subsidised ‘basic basket’ that 
was quickly dismissed as a ‘government lie’ by the urban poor in 
Mozambique). Instead, popular mobilisation reboots the moral 
economy, reminding the public and their policy elites that they have 
rights and responsibilities and that legitimacy is at stake. These 
ruptures can help re-establish the mandate for public authorities to 
act in crises, clarifying what is expected of them, and how. Protests 
provide a rough reckoning of the impacts of crises and of the policy 
responses to them – monitoring as voice rather than as bureaucratic 
data systems. And the sheer shame of being known to have failed 
to adequately feed your population – state failure on food security 
as equivalent to the emasculating failure of the breadwinner to put 
meals on the table – is, for most rulers, sanction enough. 
Implications 
Methodological lessons
A key lesson is that media content, international and national, cannot 
be relied on for ‘data’ of protests and similar events. Our research 
design had not fully factored in the variability and idiosyncrasies of 
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reporting, and we concluded that national media coverage was:
•	 closely shaped by expectations of what constituted ‘news’: in 
Kenya, coverage could be limited or events ignored because 
no official response was expected and readers were thought 
to be uninterested;
•	 subservient to the discourses and interests of government, in 
contexts such as Mozambique where economic and political 
power are highly concentrated;
•	 biased against reporting rural protests;
•	 biased against ‘trouble-makers’ (e.g. industrial workers); 
•	 biased towards events featuring violence; and
•	 formulaic in their accounts with a narrow range of descriptors 
and limited direct reporting of protestors’ viewpoints.
We also found that
•	 many protests were not covered at all;
•	 protest coverage often failed to capture the material 
grievances at issue; and
•	 histories and backstories of protest campaigns or groups 
were generally ignored. 
As most research on food riots and others protest relies heavily (until 
the advent of social media, necessarily) on print media, there are 
good reasons to be suspicious of the accuracy of the pictures these 
depict. These are often caricatures of struggles with strategic and 
thinking agendas, which interact and influence politics and policy.
Food riots as early warning of state failure
A final word on the rationale for our research: we conclude that 
international press reports of food riots in (30 or so, depending on 
source) countries around the world are unreliable. In our early efforts 
to make sense of the prevalence of these events in our four case 
study countries, we looked at national media content for a simple 
timeline of events. We found that assumptions about ‘food riots’ 
dissolved easily into more complex diffuse protests and struggles 
around subsistence - neither always riots, nor always just or mainly 
about food. The national media see the complexity and hesitate to 
describe these events as food riots. 
This is because in the international media ‘food riot’ has come to 
signify a serious breach in basic governance functions. Arguably, 
the term serves less as factual reportage of a political event than 
as early warning of a failing state. This may be why in our initial 
searches of media content for ‘food riot’ we arrived at the conclusion 
that a ‘food riot’ almost invariably occurs elsewhere. The Bangladeshi 
media reported food riots in India and sub-Saharan Africa; the Indian 
press labelled Bangladeshi garments workers’ protests ‘food riots,’ 
but witnessed none at home. A ‘food riot,’ in that sense, is a pointed 
accusation. 
‘Scaling’ the politics of provisions
The politics of provisions work at a country level, but this means they 
are ‘mis-scaled’ if the problems people face result (as they largely 
do) from the global food regime. Yet even in the 21st century with its 
complex global food economy – or perhaps because its governance 
is so abstract, distant and unknowable – the achievement of food 
security is a matter of nationhood, reaching back into colonial history, 
nationalist struggles and the socialisms of the post-colonial period. 
The popularity of food policy is ultimately tested against the founding 
myths of nation, so it is no surprise that protectionist responses to 
food crises predominate. The nation that eats together stays together. 
And democratic transitions are a moment when hungry people are 
able to register their discontent, to greater or lesser (Kenya) effect. 
People believe their voting behaviour matters, and that their voting 
intentions influence policy choices.
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What does the global nature of recent price shocks mean for a 
politics of provisions centred on the nation? The global nature of 
food systems means taking seriously the need for a properly global 
politics of food. This means a world moral economy, an international 
right-to-food movement, and a global response to food crises. But 
there are several challenges here:
WHAT TO ORGANISE AROUND AND FOR:
•	 A global politics of provisions means internationalising 
an ideology or moral economy built around nationhood 
and national affiliation. This has happened to a degree in 
transnational anti-globalisation struggles such as the food 
sovereignty movement. But (as this report has tried to avoid 
showing) an ideological alternative to globalised financial 
capitalism that is both rooted in local realities and universally 
resonant risks a normative blandness that will bury the 
seriousness of the politics in platitude.
•	 Transnational organising around the global food regime 
is dominated by producer politics, and there is undeniably 
a delinking of local and national struggles at the food 
consumption end of the food politics spectrum from the more 
internationally-networked producer politics. We currently lack 
a functionally global food consumer movement, despite the 
many moves in this direction.
WHO AND WHAT TO TARGET:
•	 Conceptualising globalisation to politicise a response; the 
complexities of global food markets and their abstract, virtual 
nature renders the target of political protest invisible, moving, 
unreachable. The practicalities of political organisation are 
not made impossible by globalisation, but the tried and 
tested means of the food riot does not easily translate into 
transnational organising.
•	 Whose behaviour, specifically, needs to change? Global 
policymakers are generally deaf to the meanings of food riots, 
unsophisticated in their understandings of domestic politics, 
insulated from electoral incentives. Global food policymakers 
need to be able to hear – and fear – food riots; food rioters 
need to find better ways of making them listen. 
HOW TO ORGANISE
•	 Protestors need to create political spaces in which rights 
claims can be made and translated into language that policy 
elites can understand – as successful shifts in discourse by the 
UN Special Rapporteurs on the Right to Food demonstrate. 
•	 But global policymaking has not always been well supported 
by civil society organising or by international research. 
Research on ‘food riots’ has rarely amplified protestor voice, 
and more usually reduced the understanding of causes to 
the mechanics of price levels and dynamics. Aid-funded 
civil society often avoids subsistence protests or food rights 
campaigning. These are contentious issues, and donor 
governments are wary of subsistence-related struggles 
because of their historic association with the left and their 
unruliness. Aid donors’ usual distance from contentious and 
unruly politics, as well as their investments in pro-market 
reforms, help to ensure that they and the civil society groups 
they fund are distanced from struggles over food policy.
•	 A really key actor is the media: as we have learned from the 
Indian movement, sympathetic, informed journalism can be 
the vanguard of a successful food rights struggle
why ThIS reSeArCh 
mATTerS
In the museum of poverty envisioned by Nobel Peace Prize Winner 
Muhammad Yunus, the food riot should be Exhibit A. A staple of 
popular politics during 18th century European transitions to capitalist 
democracy,1 the food riot is surely an anachronism in the 21st century: 
the global integration of food markets and the green revolution were 
supposed to relegate scarcity and shocks to the annals of history. 
Yet in 2008 and 2011, world food prices spiked and global market 
integration meant food costs jumped in almost all countries around 
the world. An unknown number of people in dozens of countries 
protested in waves of international revolt unseen since the European 
spring of 1848.
Figure 1 World Food prices, 1960-2014
Source: FAO Food Price Index http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/ 
[accessed 16 October 2014]
That world food prices spiked and a wave of unruly politics occurred 
are accepted, but their causal connections have not been interrogated 
in depth across multiple countries: did people protest because 
of food price spikes? Or merely at the same time? What did their 
protests achieve? Governments reacted, but were they influenced 
by protests? Did their actions secure people’s rights to food or were 
they unaccountable? Do we conclude that people must riot for their 
food rights in the 21st century? 
Crisis as the new normal
These questions arise now because the 2008 and 2011 food price 
spikes and riots marked a rupture in the transition to global capitalism 
that echoed comparable moments in the history of European capitalist 
development. Two decades of cheap food had followed the turbulent 
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period of ‘structural adjustment’ to market-oriented development 
policies in the 1970s and 1980s. Food and fuel prices started to rise 
just before the 2008 global financial crisis struck, against a backdrop 
of high-level failures to tackle climate change.2 This ‘perfect storm’ of 
events was matched by a tsunami of uprisings and unrest across the 
world in 2008. When prices spiked again in 2010-11, food, fuel and 
financial crises interacted with deeper-rooted sources of discontent 
to trigger protests across the world: against youth unemployment 
and authoritarian rule in Africa and the Middle East; rapidly rising 
inequality and austerity regimes in Europe and North America; 
and precariousness in relation to basic subsistence, as economic 
development forced people into greater reliance on volatile markets 
for their everyday needs. This was an unusually restive international 
backdrop in which to take crisis management decisions. ‘Crisis’, it 
was said in policymaking circles, ‘is the new normal’.3 
Whether or not the rupture of 2007-12 was a crisis or merely light 
shining through the cracks in the world food system, it forced a 
recognition of food security as a political matter. Although political 
variables in crisis response decision-making were generally feared by 
technocrats as populist drivers of counter-productive protectionism 
(Timmer 2010), the treatment of global food security as a technical 
and economic challenge, as framed within development policy, 
looked increasingly abstruse. The rupture highlighted the fragility 
of the right to food in a time of economic volatility. It also raised 
questions about the scope and responsibility for action when global 
food markets are volatile: who should act? What, realistically, can 
they do? 
The hunt for a politics of provisions
For the research team, observers of the global food regime and of 
governance, power and popular politics, our gut reaction was that the 
protests marked the outer limits of people’s tolerance of uncertainty 
in their most basic needs. Public authority and legitimacy, the very 
bases of rule, were endangered by the failure to protect people from 
food price spikes. This is because the terms of the social contract, 
the settlement with which the political elite legitimates its rule, rest 
implicitly on an assumption of protection against subsistence crises.4 
The chronic hunger of the unorganised poorest does not challenge 
this legitimacy with quite the power of a food crisis that threatens 
basic subsistence among the wider society. These questions stay 
unasked if food prices are low and stable, and people have other 
things to worry about – unemployment, communal, political or 
sexual violence, disasters and climate events, corruption or crime. 
But if spikes are the new normal, people need a more responsive, 
accountable food regime.
Where could a more responsive, accountable food regime come 
from? What might it look like? We discounted the possibility that 
experts can design a system to meet these requirements, given 
the failure of technocrats and international aid donors to achieve 
this over a half century of attempts to follow through on promises 
to end world hunger. Instead, and learning from the history of the 
development of capitalism, we expected this would emerge out 
of a ‘politics of provisions’ (Bohstedt 2010) – an enduring, repeat 
process of negotiation over mostly tacit understandings of rights and 
responsibilities. The specifics of those rights and responsibilities 
will shift with the times, but the form will remain the same. In a 
functional politics of provisions we would expect people to be able to 
communicate their beliefs about how food markets should run and 
what public authorities should do in times of price spikes or scarcity. 
We would also expect the public authorities to share those beliefs at 
some level, and be equipped and inclined to respond. 
A politics of provisions that is functional for food justice is arguably 
most urgent in times of volatility and adjustment (such as now), when 
shocks are most likely. Bohstedt’s study of subsistence protests in 
England’s three century transition to a market economy helps us 
make sense of the different elements of these politics (2010):
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•	 Shared ideas about how provisioning should happen and 
what public authorities should do to protect it (the ‘moral 
economy’ as defined in Thompson 1971); 
•	 triggers and political opportunities for subsistence protests
•	 the means and modes people have to organise, and their 
political ‘repertoires’; and 
•	 the political and policy responses of the public authorities. 
The politics of provisions functions to keep governments responsive 
and accountable – at least to those suffering the effects of shocks – 
•	 when moral economy ideas are at least partly shared by the 
ruling classes;
•	 when repression is not so great that affected groups are 
unable to express their discontent;
•	 when the public authorities can ‘read’ those protests properly; 
and 
•	 when a reasonable political and policy response is feasible – 
practically, fiscally and administratively. 
It is helpful to think of this as an accountability mechanism, whose 
workings become invisible when it is functioning at its best to prevent 
failures by public authorities to act on subsistence crises. Food riots 
signal failure.  
Moral economy in a global era
Documenting and understanding the moral economy of contemporary 
protestors is of core importance to these matters. Unless their 
motivations and shared beliefs are uncovered, there is the risk of 
reducing food rioters to bellied bodies. The failure to recognise 
these as political protests with ideological bases and often also with 
programmatic agendas would be both bad scholarship and bad 
policy – an unstrategic deafness to a message that is about more 
than just a struggle for subsistence in the contemporary food system. 
A key concern of this research was to make sense of the motivations 
and shared beliefs, if any, behind these protests. From the extensive 
literature about the moral economy in relation to subsistence crises, 
we asked: to what extent do such shared beliefs reflect concerns 
about how food markets should work, about rights to food, and about 
how public authorities should act? Put another way, were people 
merely angry and hungry, or were their ideas and practices also 
informed by faith in notions of a moral economy?5 
In studying these issues we are particularly interested in how the 
globalisation of recent food crises influences such ideas and their 
contemporary relevance. Food rioters in 18th century England 
protested in actual marketplaces, blocking grain exports or setting 
prices in shops. But what if the actual origin of price spikes in the 21st 
century is the global ‘market’, and the marketplace needing correction 
is not in Kolkata but Chicago? Of whom should demands for action 
then be made? The globalisation of food trade has implications not 
only for normative ideas about how markets should work, but also for 
who is expected to act, and to whom protests are targeted. Whereas 
the public authorities may have been local or national when French 
sans-culottes rioted, it is not clear national or local authorities have 
the same degree of power over food markets in 21st century Port-
au-Prince. Would it be more rational for food rioters to denounce 
the World Trade Organisation or the World Bank for promoting the 
globalisation of the food-agriculture system? Would it be reasonable 
or realistic to expect them to draw such connections? Why would 
we expect an agricultural economist in Washington DC to have 
reason or means to respond to such protests – or to even know 
that they have happened? Whereas a local official or politician is 
held to account (if only through their command of authority) when 
subsistence crises occur, the global technocracy at whom at least 
some part of these protests may be rationally assumed to be aimed, 
are immunized against popular politics – at least at country level.
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The governments of small countries with highly integrated food 
markets may lack the power to protect people against food price 
changes that arise in global commodity markets. Or they may use 
this as an excuse to explain inaction. Can moral economy ideas 
survive persistent failures by public authorities? The moral economy 
in the historical past was fed by its successes; what if food riots fail, 
or are put down, or become so routine that they are safely ignored? 
How meaningful can protests and the associated ideas about the 
moral economy be if their target is a national government that is 
faced with volatile global food markets?6 
The Right to Food and food sovereignty movements 
The politics of provisions are already global, through the Right to 
Food and food sovereignty movements. Both of these important 
developments in the global politics of food have strong moral economy 
dimensions, through their normative emphases on how provisioning 
should be governed. The food sovereignty movement has gained 
momentum in the past decades specifically through localised 
grassroots resistance to the globalisation of food, and to defend 
the values of local control and production systems. Underlying the 
discourse of food sovereignty, is a notion of systematic transformation 
and structural change, where it is argued that people are poor not 
because they are not ‘included’ (e.g. in markets), but because the 
terms of their inclusion are embedded in highly unequal, exploitative 
and oppressive relations (Mcmichael and Schneider 2011). Food 
sovereignty calls for the right of each nation to maintain and develop 
its own capacity to produce its basic food, respecting cultural and 
productive diversity. This approach is strongly embedded in moral 
principles of entitlement and redistribution, where resource-poor 
farmers (especially historically disadvantaged groups composed of 
women, agricultural workers, indigenous people, landless labourers, 
etc.) move beyond being framed as ‘beneficiaries’ towards being in 
control of the food system (Pimbert 2006). The approach talks explicitly 
about the power politics of the food system through a rejection of the 
corporate food regime and agri-food monopoly power (McMichael 
2009), to demand the right of people to define their own food and 
agriculture. It focuses on large-scale redistributive land reforms, 
family farming, regionally based food systems, democratisation 
of agriculture through community rights to water and seed; and 
opposes development-induced land displacement, land-grabbing 
and northern agricultural subsidies (La Via Campesina 2011). Moral 
economic principles regarding the just and equitable distribution of 
resources, locally and at a global geopolitical level, is foundational 
in the discourse of food sovereignty. The food sovereignty approach 
calls for the Right to Food under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights to encompass a broader meaning beyond access to food to 
include an empowerment agenda for marginalised food producers 
(Mechlem 2004). Food sovereignty is a prerequisite for the right to 
food.
As the country case studies for this research show, these values 
were often articulated in various forms in the local food-related 
struggles we document and analyse. More aligned with our present 
focus on consumption (rather than production), the Right to Food 
movement gives us reasons to focus on recent protests and their 
meanings. If claims to food within the moral economy rest on custom 
or tradition, how might a legally enforceable human right to food 
change that? And how might claims based on custom and tradition 
be translated into a right to food in the first place? To what extent 
might the institutional and legal basis shape the ideas about how 
food markets should function? Does a legal right to food pre-empt 
the need to riot? Do riots seek to establish the legal, enforceable 
right to food?
hOw we DID ThIS 
reSeArCh 
Research questions 
With these motivations in mind, the research was designed to answer 
the following three main questions: 
i. To what extent did grievances about hunger and food price 
volatility feature in popular mobilisation in 2007-12?
Specifically, what were the grievances, how were they framed 
and articulated, who mobilised, when and how?
ii. To what extent were mobilisations between 2007-2012 
underpinned by ruptures in moral economies?
Specifically, what are people’s expectation of state and market 
vis-à-vis food? What is the language, dynamics, customs 
and histories of moral economy thinking and its influences 
on political life and culture, with particular reference to 
globalisation?
iii. What was the political and policy response?
What were the impacts of and response to food price volatility 
in 2007-12? Did responses amount to increased institutional 
accountability for hunger?
Research design
There are many ways of making sense of why people protested and 
with what effect. The dominant approach in international development 
research takes big datasets and analyses correlations between price, 
political, and protest variables. Big ‘n’ studies tend to ‘sophisticate 
and quantify evidence which is only imperfectly understood’ by 
relying on ‘spasmodic’ explanations of why people riot. It is our view 
that in the absence of an agent-centred understanding of these 
events, the study of riots reduces political actors to bellied bodies. 
Our motivations were to understand these riots not as the reflexes of 
angry hunger but as embodying political perspectives on how food 
markets should work. 
The (undeniably helpful) big picture painted by big ‘n’ studies runs the 
risk of becoming cartoonish (protestors cast as mere bellied beings 
responding to the material stimulus of hunger). But this picture is also 
coloured by its reliance on media sources as ‘data’. Social historical 
approaches to the study of food riots were of course constrained by 
the limits of historiography: they could not go and interview people 
who had participated in protests, and were inevitably reliant on 
documentary sources. But we are not so constrained, and careful 
recent work by Sneyd et al. supports our own findings about the 
serious dangers of over-reliance on media accounts of protests as a 
source of ‘data’. No matter how big the sample, the problem of bias 
remains imprinted indelibly on these data.
Our choice of four in-depth country case studies is based on our 
assessment of quantitative approaches as both too confident about 
the value of big ‘n’ data and too uninterested in actors’ interpretations 
and contexts. We gain only a partial account from these about why 
or how people protest (or not) when prices spike, nor do they shed 
much light on the political economic logic of the policy response (or 
failure to respond). 
Our position was that we need an actors’-eye view of these events, 
and so we focused on; 
•	 gaining a sense of the scale and type of protests through media 
content analysis to construct ‘political event catalogues’;
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•	 interrogating these political event catalogues through in-depth 
work with selected protest movements and communities to 
explore their motive for and means of organising; and
•	 attempting to reconstruct the logic of the policy response 
through interviews with policymakers and practitioners about 
the events of this time. 
This combination of data collection and analytical strategy aimed 
to bring together the ideas, triggers, means of organising, and 
repertoires of response that comprise the politics of provisions. This 
multi-disciplinary approach was led by classic political sociology 
concerns about state-society relationships, but borrowed theoretical 
and methodological aspects of social history, anthropology, 
development studies, human rights and political science. 
While we sought depth and interpretive understanding in each case, 
we also prioritised the need to make general sense of our findings. 
We needed to move beyond descriptive analyses of what had 
happened and why in Bangladesh, India, Kenya and Mozambique 
to surmise what that meant for other similar people in comparable 
places and times. For this reason, the research was designed to 
include a comparative analysis. This synthesis report sets out some 
of the chief findings from that comparative analysis. 
FOUR STRUGGLES FOR FOOD RIGHTS
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bangladesh: the food riots that never were
In 2008, the international media listed Bangladesh among the low-
income countries that saw food riots during the global food price 
crisis. The most notable of these events took place in the pre-
monsoon heat of April 13th, when workers in the export-oriented 
garments sector took to the streets in a graphic flash of anger at 
low pay in a time of high and rising staple food prices. Around that 
time, the Government of Bangladesh set in motion efforts to stabilize 
food prices, to protect those hit hardest by the spike. These efforts 
were not simple matters: the crisis was global, not easily managed 
by a single country government. Meanwhile, India, the main source 
of Bangladesh’s rice imports, closed its borders to protect its own 
citizens. Yet the Bangladesh authorities ultimately succeeded, and 
their policy choices and the institutional architecture that made 
them possible affirmed Bangladesh’s reputation for effective and 
responsive food (if not nutrition) security policy. 
This research set out to find out whether these events were causally 
related: did these ‘food riots’ trigger or activate these responsive 
and effective food security policies in any sense? For contemporary 
Bangladesh, we hypothesized that there were both strong moral 
economy and powerful political economy reasons to believe that food 
riots may have played such a triggering role. Garments workers had 
the means and motive to organise. Policymakers and politicians had 
the incentives and the institutions with which to respond. To tackle 
these issues, the research used a multi-sited research methodology 
that integrated a) catalogues of the numbers and types of protests 
that occurred, using media content analysis; b) close-grained case 
studies of the motivations and organization of protest groups using 
primary qualitative research; and c) semi-structured interviews with 
key policymakers, activists and scholars, designed to reconstruct 
the policy thinking of the time. 
Figure 2 rice price and protests in Bangladesh, 2007-12
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PICTURE 1 Gaibandha Town, November 2013. Ths woman has just bought her regulation 5kg of oms 
rice. People often complain of the quality, but she is showing us that, today, it is good.
The results of the research failed to validate the proposition that 
riots engendered accountability for hunger in this time and place: 
we found no strong evidence that any of the protests, even the most 
visceral and important, the garments workers’ protests, had directly 
influenced the policy response. But this was not because popular 
protest had no power in this context. Instead, it reflected the fact that 
protest was, in the main, less urgent than elsewhere. The garments 
workers’ protests highlighted the plight of low paid urban workers 
during the food crisis, but for most of the rest of the population, the 
official machinery was already working to address the situation in its 
usual mode. If anything, the research findings suggest the causality 
went in the opposite direction – that the existence (over a longer time 
period) of relatively effective policies and institutional architecture 
for response, and an associated expectation of public action during 
subsistence crises, meant that it made sense for garments workers 
(and a small number of other groups) to protest at this time. Their 
basic survival was threatened, they were able to organize, and 
they had reasonable expectations that their actions would elicit a 
response. 
That the Government of Bangladesh is moderately responsive to 
acute food shocks does not mean it has resolved its serious and 
substantial problems of hunger and under-nutrition. That is clearly 
not the case, in particular for the third of the population subsisting 
below the ungenerous poverty line (BBS 2011; World Bank 2013). 
But what Bangladesh does appear to have achieved is a degree 
of institutionalised responsiveness which, under regular conditions, 
and in comparative perspective, works reasonably effectively to 
prevent mass descent into hunger (FAO 2014). The poorest and the 
chronically hungry never, in any case, protest. This means it is the 
protection of the middle sections of the poor and the vulnerable non-
poor against that sudden descent which defuses the possibility of 
riot.
Looked at closely, both the ‘food riots’ and the policy response turned 
out to be more ambiguous and contingent than their headlines 
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suggested. What the long lenses of the global media framed as 
‘food riots’ looked different up close and through the filter of domestic 
politics. Arguably, these were not food riots in any common sense 
of the term. As for the policy response, while over the medium term 
this was sound enough, for those facing hunger it was too late and 
perhaps also too little. That the government of the moment was an 
unelected military-backed caretaker regime lent the perception that 
the lagged response reflected the absence of powerful electoral 
pressures for action. Tellingly, the popular assessment of the situation 
was that a democratically-elected (‘political government’) would 
have responded faster and better (though it is not clear whether this 
is correct). In any case, by the time the official response was in gear, 
the strong supply response from local farmers helped push the rice 
price back down in 2009 (M. Hossain and Deb 2010; M. Hossain 
2010). By 2011, the Government was better prepared for the spike, 
and was able to stabilise domestic prices and improve access to 
staples through Open Market Sales.
The garments workers’ protests did not cause the policies that 
helped people to manage the food price spike, but our analysis 
suggests that these events were correlated: both were rooted in the 
moral and political economy of subsistence crises in Bangladesh. 
Our analysis of the 2007-12 period is a mere snapshot of a more 
dynamic historical cycle of interaction between popular mobilisation 
and policy responses. During this period, ‘food riots’ did not trigger 
the policy response, but over the longer term the causality seems to 
run in the other direction. Garments workers protested because they 
were excluded from the protections enjoyed by other Bangladeshis, 
and because they had good reason to believe that responsive and 
effective policies could also be established for them. Their struggle 
– framed as wages and workers’ rights, not food rights – continues. 
We conclude that ‘food riots,’ or subsistence protests, did not occur 
on any significant scale in Bangladesh because the extraordinary 
sacrifices they require were less needed here than in some of the 
other countries. It is important to emphasise again that the poorest 
and most hungry do not, in this context, protest (N. Hossain 2005). 
But for those organisationally and personally equipped to mobilise, 
there is a functioning ‘politics of provisions’ that ensures that ruling 
elites cannot ignore mass subsistence crises like 2008 – or at 
least they cannot do so without incurring a disempowering loss of 
legitimacy. For politico-historical, electoral and possibly ecological 
reasons, the compact between the Bangladeshi masses and their 
ruling elites centres on the protection of subsistence during shocks. 
The memory of the 1974 famine casts a long shadow over food policy 
here, serving as a constant and painful reminder of the fragility both 
of subsistence and of political legitimacy in this context. The politics 
of provisions in Bangladesh work to keep basic food security, albeit 
not nutrition or chronic hunger, atop the political and policy agenda. 
Few Bangladeshis need to risk actual food riots because most of 
those likely to protest and exposed to such shocks receive the 
protection they need, more or less when they need it. By the time a 
riot occurs, it is already too late: the threat of the loss of legitimacy is 
powerful enough to drive a reasonable policy and political response. 
THEM BELLY FULL (BUT WE HUNGRY)
18
InDIA
FOUR STRUGGLES FOR FOOD
19
India: the right response
The Indian experience stands in contrast to the other cases we 
explored. First, India did not witness the food price volatility that 
corresponded with global price hikes. The period from 2007-2012 
was characterised instead by a steady increase in national prices, 
which rose along with global prices, but failed accompany the decline 
in global food prices. By 2013, food price inflation in India was the 
highest the country had seen in three decades. 
Second, and consequently, popular mobilisation did not take the 
form of food riots, with the exception of West Bengal (see below). 
Rather, rising inflation and narrowing access to food (from forests 
and rural patronage links) led to popular mobilisation around food, led 
by opposition parties as well as social movements like by the Right 
to Food Campaign initiated in 2000. Food prices have historically 
been a political issue in India, but the Right to Food Campaign has 
given it a particular form and visibility in recent years. Finally, popular 
mobilisation was mainly rural.
Figure 3 Food prices, india and the world, 2005-11
Given the diversity of India, we chose to focus mainly on mobilisation 
around food insecurity and malnutrition in one state, Madhya 
Pradesh, which represents the archetypal strategy for organising 
a right-to-food movement at the grassroots and linking it up to 
policy strategizing at the national level. Against this backdrop was 
the unusual case of the violent riots in West Bengal, where angry 
villagers burnt private shops with licenses to sell subsidized food, 
and rose up against the perceived corruption of shop dealers in 
cahoots with the ruling Left Front government.
Thus the main plot of the Indian story, of which the Madhya Pradesh 
narrative is an example, suggests that citizens, to varying degrees, 
place accountability for hunger squarely at the doorstep of the Indian 
state; and state officials, at least rhetorically, acknowledge this 
responsibility. Popular mobilisation has taken place in India against 
rising food prices (despite little food price volatility) in varying forms, 
and ultimately some institutionalisation of such accountability has 
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occurred through the passage of the National Food Security Act 
(NFSA) in 2013. 
picture 2 March to a Food corporation oF india godown in rourkela, odisha (2010) 
as part oF the “tala kholo (open the locks) abhiyan” across the country deManding 
iMMediate distribution oF Foodgrains FroM governMent stocks at subsidised prices.
Yet the roots of this politics around food began long before 2007, 
and have to be located within a longer trajectory of state initiatives 
and popular mobilisations. Longstanding issues such as memories 
of famine and hunger from earlier periods, including the Bengal 
famine of 1943, the history of operation and expansion of the Public 
Distribution System providing subsidized food since the 1960s, the 
debates around the setting of the poverty line, the ‘Right to Food’ 
case that started in 2001, and the related Supreme Court orders 
that followed, all form part of the public imagination of both those 
mobilising as well as those responding to food insecurity of the 
poorest. 
Moreover, even over this longer trajectory, while one might argue 
that popular mobilisation, including the Right to Food campaign, 
has evoked accountability for hunger in the form of the passing of 
the NFSA, this is a story larger than the popular mobilisation as a 
response to food price inflation, or even about the moral economy 
underpinning access to food. The broader environment of the 
decades starting in the 2000s has been one where socio-economic 
entitlements of all kinds are being demanded as well as accepted as 
legitimate by the state (as reflected by the legislating of entitlements 
related to right to education, right to work, right to information etc.). 
To put flesh on this skeletal storyline, let us start with the riots in 
West Bengal, which had their roots in the differential prices of 
subsidized vs. market grains. When wheat prices (which were 
usually not much higher in the market) rose as a result of inflation, 
there was a growing demand for the subsidized wheat. However, 
when this was unavailable, due to the imposition of quotas by the 
central government (or corruption, as it was perceived), there was 
widespread dissatisfaction among the slightly better off villagers, 
which led to spontaneous protests to demand that ration shop 
owners replenish the supplies they had diverted to the open market 
or refund the villagers. The rioters themselves had been emboldened 
by the opportunities opened up by the prevailing mood of ‘poribortan’ 
(change) in the state with the popular opinion turning against the 
ruling Left Front government and what was seen as industry-friendly 
policies taking land away from farmers. The policy response in West 
Bengal took the form of demanding larger allocations of subsidized 
wheat from the central government, which were denied.  Later, there 
was a reduction in the price of rice allocated through the public 
distribution system on the eve of the elections. This was all there 
was by way of state intervention, despite the protests being sharper 
and more violent. This partly reflected the fact that the central 
government controlled the supply of non-BPL grain, and resisted 
claims for increased allocations by West Bengal. 
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picture 3 Food riots in BirBhum
Photo Credit: Outlook Magazine (http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?235898) 
By contrast, Madhya Pradesh is a more mainstream story, where 
food insecurity did not evoke spontaneous protests, and of how 
social movement activism around the right to food could activate 
accountability for hunger. Our research suggested that food price 
inflation issues were also linked to a range of other rises in cost 
of living and declining access to local food sources such as own 
farming, forests etc. In the tribal areas of Madhya Pradesh we 
studied, reduced self-sufficiency was resulting in out-migration. 
Malnutrition was an acute issue, highlighted several times in 
the national media. Mobilisation around malnutrition occurred in 
pockets, and in Satna was led by a local organization that was linked 
to the state and national level right-to-food campaign (a feature 
true of popular mobilisation around food in other states as well). 
These links with state and national level actors provided leverage 
to the mobilisation vis-à-vis local actors. Furthermore, these links 
also offered new sources of information, mobilising strategies, new 
repertoires of action (such as public hearings) and access to media 
networks that enabled the organization to punch above its weight. 
During this period of high salience of malnutrition along with the 
pockets of mobilisation, Madhya Pradesh saw a slew of long-term 
measures in dealing with the problem of malnutrition and hunger. 
Thus, in both cases, while access to food formed part of the causes 
of mobilisation, political opportunities (often unpredictable) opened 
up new spaces for action. 
At the national level, the Right to Food campaign gained legitimacy 
from hundreds of such grassroots groups, enabling it to demand 
comprehensive policies to ensure food security. The policy response 
on the part of the state has been substantial: in 2012 India finally 
passed the National Food Security Act, which provides a series of 
entitlements to food through state led programmes. Although the 
passing of a law does not ensure security against hunger, it has 
moved one step towards a robust politics of provision. The campaign 
was able to achieve this partly because of its simultaneous critical 
and constructive stance. As a senior policy maker stated:
a campaign which is only in the mode of a critique and in the 
mode of setting up of rights has its limitations – it must get 
engaged in the difficult task of reform…it has to basically ‘work 
the state’ … the anger of the people have to be mobilised into 
a constructive direction.
Another senior policymaker noted that the Right to Food campaign 
engaged in ‘refining the moral economy – not just showing the moral 
bankruptcy of the state but showing how it can be reformed…’.
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Figure 4 the national Food security act, 2013
The National Food Security Act has now opened up new possibilities 
in the battle against hunger. Yet, India is a long way from addressing 
structural inequities: including (but not restricted) to the agrarian 
crisis, land, gender relations, and restrictions on access to natural 
resources that are primarily responsible for impoverishing people. 
This leaves us with the question whether the state response is 
merely to ameliorate rural distress and keep it at a manageable level 
in order to contain popular discontent. 
KENYA: Plunder or Blunder?
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KenyA: PlunDer Or blunDer ?
Kenya is not prepared for another spike in global and regional food 
and energy prices. In 2008, Kenya suffered from the combination of 
post-election violence, rising prices for food and fuel internationally 
and poor harvests nationally, which sent the annual rate of food price 
inflation as high as 27 per cent. This, and a subsequent spike in 
2011, sparked protests both large and small, the most visible and 
memorable being the Unga Revolution.
The cost of living began to rise noticeably in Kenya from 2002, when 
the new regime embraced the free market and Kenya’s economy 
started to grow. Millions of low paid informal workers and small 
farmers found themselves less and less able to make ends meet 
in an increasingly commercialised economy. In 2005, Bunge la 
Mwananchi, (the ‘ordinary people’s parliament’), began agitating 
loudly about cost of living issues at its public meetings in Nairobi and 
other city centres. Activist leaders were protesting in their vibrant 
weekly outdoor debates as well as in behind-the-scenes campaigns 
in low-income neighbourhoods. 
The price of maize, Kenya’s staple food, depends mainly on the 
local harvest, although to meet its growing shortfall the country 
increasingly relies on imports from Tanzania, Uganda and beyond. 
While responding to world prices especially of oil, prices are also 
strongly affected by Government of Kenya policies that protect larger 
producers by maintaining high prices. When world food prices rose 
in 2008, Kenya’s prices also climbed rapidly. But while world prices 
started to fall in mid-2008, returning to 2007 levels by the end of the 
year, Kenya prices continued to climb all the way through 2009.
On May 31st 2008, police broke up a Bunge la Mwananchi-organised 
demonstration and arrested leaders. Undeterred, Bunge continued to 
organize a series of protests, culminating in a high-profile disruption 
of Independence Day celebrations in December 2008. The name 
‘Unga Revolution’, as it came to be known (unga is the maize flour 
that most Kenyans eat every day), was first heard on Labour Day 
2009, when workers heckled the Labour Minister. Chants of ‘unga!’ 
‘stima!’ (electricity!) and ‘maisha ngumu!’ (life is hard!) were heard. 
Activists and ordinary protesters were arrested, giving immense 
publicity to the protest. 
In 2010 Kenyans received a new constitution, including a bill of 
rights. For the first time Kenyans were guaranteed, among other 
economic and social rights, progressive realisation of a right to be 
‘free from hunger, and to have adequate food of acceptable quality’ 
(Article 43 (1)(c)). But in 2011, when food and transport prices shot 
up yet again and once again stayed high even after world food 
and fuel prices dropped back, and when there was little response 
from government, the Unga Revolution re-emerged with repeated 
marches on Nairobi city centre, demanding that the right to food 
be respected. Media coverage of the protests tended to focus on 
the colourful demonstrations and the arrests, rather than giving any 
details of the issues and their genesis. 
No protests were registered in the national press in rural areas, 
but our researchers learned that there had been numerous small 
incidences of spontaneous riot, often at moments when inadequate 
relief food was being distributed in ways that people felt were opaque 
and unfair. Meanwhile teachers and medical workers came out on 
strike several times during our study period, calling for a living wage, 
and the consumer federation took the state to court for undermining 
the right to food through failing to control the price of fuel.
The Government’s response appeared inadequate to the inhabitants 
of our two research sites. Government officials responded to 
the protests with a mix of repression – arrests and threats – and 
appeasement – promises and small handouts. Short-term measures 
included a three-month subsidy of maize meal to urban consumers. 
This policy was developed without attention to how the subsidy would 
actually reach consumers, whether deliberately or not is unclear, 
and as a result of this ‘plunder or blunder’, the bulk of it was promptly 
bought up by entrepreneurs, repackaged and sold on at high prices. 
Another measure, dubbed the ‘maize scandal’ by the press, involved 
the loss of an estimated 27 million dollars. Late in 2008, a year after 
prices had begun to rise, the government announced that imported 
maize which would be sold at half the cost price to gazetted millers. 
These millers would then sell it on at low prices to consumers. The low 
prices never materialised. People in Nairobi’s urban slums, watching 
the story in the media, felt a mix of cynicism, despair and outrage. 
After this failure, government lifted the 50 per cent import tax on 
grain imports. Traders moved immediately to bring in food, importing 
more than a million tonnes in a month. The port and transport links 
jammed. It took eight months before prices finally began to fall. 
Policy makers admit that the measures were driven by momentary 
political anxiety rather than commitment to institute a sustained 
accountable response to hunger that might effectively mitigate the 
differential impact of food price shocks on millions of people on low 
incomes. 
Kenya’s drought response and famine relief programmes have all 
but eliminated hunger-related deaths over the last two decades. 
While this is laudable, it leaves unaddressed the problem of chronic 
hunger or persistent undernourishment caused by high food prices. 
Since the price rises of 2008, Kenyans eat less, and eat cheaper 
but less nutritious foods. Kenya is now the African country with the 
fourth-highest rate of undernourishment (FAO estimates were that 
26 per cent of Kenyans were undernourished in 2012): not starving, 
but suffering from an inadequate intake of nutrients.
Donors have supported efforts to create social safety net programmes 
for the most vulnerable. Examples include cash transfer programmes 
for the elderly, orphaned and vulnerable children, those living with 
HIV/AIDS, and through a Hunger Safety Nets Programme. These 
have limited coverage, and heavy donor dependence raises 
questions on their sustainability. 
The fundamental obstacle to securing affordable food is two-fold. 
First, skewed policies such as maize marketing interventions and 
production subsidies that benefit only the producers of surplus: 50 
per cent of Kenya’s maize production comes from only 2 per cent of 
farmers; and 70 per cent of Kenya’s small-scale maize farmers are 
net buyers, meaning that they end up buying more than they sell, so 
the producer prices offered as an incentive by the National Cereals 
and Produce Board are ultimately of no benefit to them. The second 
factor is government failure to hold to account its own officials as 
well as millers and grain traders engaging in corrupt and predatory 
practices that drive food prices up. 
Citizens’ expectations of the state have been dampened by years of 
experience of a system that rewards the rich and makes unpredictable 
and inadequate gestures to the poor. This has translated into a weak 
moral economy around food and dampened popular mobilisation 
and allowed media to revel in the spectacle but not the content of 
protests. A system of accountability for hunger that delivers on the 
constitutional right to food is unlikely to be secured without a national 
right-to-food movement that cuts across urban and rural parts of 
the country in a sustained effort to eradicate predatory and corrupt 
practices in food markets and food aid. 
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mOZAmbIQue
mOZAmbIQue: burning tyres, protest rap and 
authoritarian responsiveness
After a brutal civil war ended in 1992, Mozambique became a byword 
for political stability and an exemplar of neoliberal reform followed by 
steady economic growth. The failure of this growth to reduce either 
the extent of food insecurity or the number of Mozambicans living in 
poverty – which actually rose by almost a million people in the five 
years to 2008 despite an average annual economic growth rate of 
8 per cent – was challenged by only a few critical voices (Hanlon 
and Cunguara 2010). As a ‘donor darling’, the country obediently 
aligned itself with the dictates of the Washington Consensus and 
was rewarded with ever-larger volumes of aid, even as its once-
robust industrial and agro-processing infrastructure was dismantled 
and it slipped back into dependence on primary commodity exports. 
The ruling party, Frelimo (the Mozambique Liberation Front), 
continued an authoritarian political tradition dating back to the one-
party state period that had followed the end of Portuguese colonial 
rule. Frelimo’s grip on power was legitimated by a series of local 
and national election victories, financed by the wealth accrued from 
a virtual monopoly of business opportunities and enforced by a 
network of party cells that extended into every neighbourhood, state-
owned company or government office.
Yet in February 2008 and again in September 2010, the ruling 
elite was taken by surprise and shocked into policy reversals after 
the capital Maputo and a number of other towns and cities were 
paralysed by protests. These protests followed the government’s 
announcement of increases in the prices of bread, urban transport 
(known as chapa) and other state-regulated goods and services. 
Improvised barricades and burning tyres blocked off access to 
central business districts. Crowds of protesters refused to leave 
the streets in the face of strident condemnation from the authorities 
and a violent response from the police. Text messages calling for 
all Mozambican citizens to join a greve – literally a ‘strike’ – spread 
virally, until the government forced the mobile operators to shut down 
their SMS services. Rap musicians celebrated the advent of ‘people 
power’, and openly satirised the Frelimo elite as corrupt and out of 
touch. Voices of dissent spread beyond the chapa stops and street 
markets, flooded online social networks and began to be heard 
across the hitherto largely subservient news media. In both 2008 
and 2010 the government began by denouncing the protests as 
either political subversion or mindless vandalism – but ended up by 
reversing the price rises that had triggered the initial mobilisations, 
and announcing a raft of policies aimed at reducing food insecurity. 
During the research that we carried out in sites which had seen 
protests in 2008 and/or 2010 – three popular neighbourhoods in 
Maputo and a rural and an urban area in Chokwe, a market town in 
the flood-prone Limpopo valley – our interviewees and focus group 
participants identified a number of government policy announcements 
and actions as having been a direct response to the riots. Although 
they were mostly dismissive of these measures’ ability to make a 
difference to everyday food security, people saw the fact that they 
had been announced at all as powerful evidence of the effectiveness 
of the greve as a political strategy – and of a wider sea-change in 
attitudes among both the citizenry and elites, with the former waking 
up to the power of mobilisation and the latter learning not to take the 
urban masses for granted. 
People in these areas were outspoken in their contempt for the 
current ruling elite clustered around President Armando Emílio 
Guebuza, but differentiated it from previous incarnations of Frelimo 
rule – especially the heroic socialist period under Samora Machel, in 
which hunger was remembered as an experience that was shared 
by rulers and ruled, as government ration shops distributed the 
meagre food supplies that were available in an economy ravaged 
by civil war and agricultural collapse. Regardless of the historical 
accuracy of this perception, the nostalgic refrain ‘in Samora’s day…’ 
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was a recurrent one in our interviews and focus group discussions, 
used to signify a period not only of greater economic equality but 
also of Presidential intolerance of corruption and self-interest among 
government officials.
Another refrain was the popular phrase quem não trambuca não 
manduca – ‘those who do not work, do not eat’. The moral economy 
in both rural and urban Mozambique is strongly marked by a 
perception that food security is something to be earned through hard 
work by everyone except the very elderly or infirm. The government’s 
violation of this moral economy is perceived as lying not in a failure 
to provide food directly but in a failure to preserve the relationship 
between wages and food prices. The result of this failure is that the 
idle children of the elite grow fat while even the hardest-working semi-
skilled labourer cannot earn enough to feed a family – a situation 
described by one middle-aged man in the Maputo neighbourhood 
of Ferroviário as a ‘psychological torture’ consciously perpetrated 
by the government. Focus group participants recalled that food 
prices had also risen in the 1990s under another Frelimo president, 
Joaquim Chissano, but insisted that during that period wages had 
risen enough to keep pace, whereas since 2008 they have been 
outstripped by inflation. The situation is even more serious for the 
poorest workers, who are forced to spend a higher proportion of their 
wages on food, because since 2008 food price inflation has pulled 
ahead of the general rise in consumer prices.
Figure 6 consumer price index For FoodstuFFs versus other goods in 
mozamBique, 2002-2010
Although government spokespeople insistently tried to shift the 
blame for price hikes onto international markets, the protestors 
insisted that the government itself was responsible for the resulting 
squeeze on their ability to travel to work by chapa and still afford a 
basic diet. Despite the fact that most former state-owned companies 
have been privatised and the vast majority of workers are in the 
informal sector, the fact that the protests were referred to as greves 
– strikes – suggests a popular imaginary of the government as an 
employer refusing to allow its employees to earn a fair wage. Frelimo 
has undoubtedly fed this imaginary by trying to become omnipresent 
in social, political and economic spaces, by continuing to appeal to 
the legacy of the socialist one-party state and by its leaders’ tendency 
to make grand promises on which they have no ability to deliver – 
like the promise to quintuple wheat production made after the 2008 
protests or the announcement after the 2010 protests that the urban 
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poor would have subsidised access to a ‘basic basket’ of foodstuffs, 
neither of which produced any concrete results.
In November 2012, popular mobilisation for another greve began in 
response to a fresh set of price hikes, but the government managed 
to avert renewed rioting by using a three-pronged strategy. The first 
prong was macroeconomic policy: this was based on using what 
an academic who was one of our key informants called an ‘anti-
riot exchange rate’ to moderate the impact of global price rises on 
the local cost of imported commodities such as wheat and fuel. The 
second prong was dialogue: the price rises were announced well 
in advance and in combination with specific mitigation measures, 
and officials used radio phone-ins to test the popular response to 
these measures before their official introduction. The third prong 
was repression: SMS services were again restricted, and potential 
flashpoints were flooded with riot police on the day that the increase 
took effect. 
Thus, between 2008 and 2012, a form of ‘authoritarian 
responsiveness’ seems to have come to the fore in Mozambique’s 
politics of provisions, in which repression of protest is combined with 
increased sensitivity to the concerns of the urban poor.
This is not a responsiveness mediated by democratic institutions: 
donor-supported civil society efforts to build a sustained campaign 
on food security issues came to nothing, and a draft bill on the right 
to food was shelved before making its way through Parliament. 
Despite significant gains by the urban-based Democratic Movement 
of Mozambique (MDM) party in the 2013 municipal elections, and a 
strong challenge to Frelimo’s hegemony by both the MDM and the 
older, mainly rural-based opposition party Renamo in the October 
2014 Presidential elections, neither Frelimo nor either of the main 
opposition parties has incorporated concrete measures to tackle the 
rising cost of living into a consistent political platform. 
There is therefore little sign that the protests have led Mozambique 
to overcome its longstanding failure to consolidate a repertoire of 
peaceful and democratic modalities of citizen-state dialogue on 
poverty and food insecurity. Nevertheless, the government’s changed 
behaviour between 2008 and 2012 seems to reflect an awareness 
that its previous cavalier disregard for the impact of price rises on the 
food and livelihood security of the urban poor is no longer tenable.
THEM BELLY FULL (BUT WE HUNGRY)
30
whAT we leArneD
The politics of provisions in contemporary 
developing countries
Our most important shared findings are that a politics of provisions 
rumbles on in the background of each of these countries, regardless 
of food price spikes or inflation. These are ongoing negotiations, but 
they grab attention only at moments when the tacit consensus on 
which they rest is shaken. It is then that they need reaffirmation or 
adjustment, whether that is because of the rapid changes in the world 
food economy, or because of how people’s relation to it has altered. 
And these politics are ideological and strategic, not the reflexive acts 
of hungry, angry animals. They work, to a greater or lesser degree, 
to keep states to an implicit bargain about protection against the 
extremes of subsistence shocks. 
Moral economies in the 21st century
A key point about these domestic politics of provisions is that they 
are ongoing, an always-incomplete negotiation between rulers and 
ruled. Negotiations do not start at the point at which prices spike or 
crops fail, and they only pause when a new food security programme 
is enacted. As the Indian case shows, a successful social movement 
can politicise even chronic hunger, so that negotiations continue 
even when no particularly acute episode is to hand. Yet even in India, 
food price inflation sparked action in West Bengal, at a moment of 
major political unrest. The country cases are a mere snapshot of a 
picture that has been developing over a longer period.
At stake in these negotiations is broadly the right to protection against 
subsistence shocks. The specifics of the negotiations, including who 
has the moral authority to make which claims against whom – are 
highly context dependent. But broad outlines of the negotiating 
positions are often similar across cases. Such protections may – 
and frequently do – entail curbing the power to profit from (in some 
instances, to cause) subsistence crises. The Indian case aside, it is 
interesting to note how often these rights are conceived in negative 
terms, as the right to protection against immoral or criminal acts 
popularly believed, often with good reason and media coverage, to 
prevent people from eating as well as they ought. In our cases, these 
include the suspicions that:
•	 Mozambican politicians are being deliberately cruel when 
they allow food prices to rise beyond the reach of the urban 
working class;
•	 wheat ration dealers in West Bengal continue to make illicit 
profits when public food allocations are cut even while grain 
prices rise;
•	 Bangladeshi factory owners profit from low minimum wages 
while their workers choose between rice or rent; and 
•	 maize millers pocket a government subsidy intended to be 
passed onto Nairobi slum-dwellers. 
Each of these has a strong popular moral sentiment expressing, 
variously, discontent over inequality, unfairness, exploitation and 
oppression, and protection of the oppressors and the corrupt by 
the very power-holders who are mandated to uphold and protect 
rights. We do hear in these rumbles, particularly in India, Kenya, 
and to a more modest extent, Bangladesh, claims for positive action 
to realise economic and social rights – demands for subsidised 
food most notably. In Mozambique, the protestors called for prices 
that are controlled by the government – notably those of bread and 
urban transport – to be brought back into line with the wages of the 
urban poor. Yet this is not an outright rejection of the market per se. 
Instead, it is mainly a claim for protection from markets that work 
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only to benefit the powerful. 
Let us put this another way: we can hear, in these rumbles, a 
view which is mistrustful of markets for the most vital elements of 
subsistence. This is on grounds that these frequently fail to work 
in favour of the poor and politically weak. These are clear calls for 
market regulation, and are heard even among the small shopkeepers 
and traders who supply the bottom end of the market: 
Things were good during Kenyatta’s time because if he 
instructed that the price of a certain thing should go up 
by one cent, that is what happened. If his officers found 
that you had increased it by more than that, you would 
be punished. [Mathare, Kenya, Roadside food sellers]
In a way, price controls, like we had before Moi’s time, 
would help …The government would select basic 
commodities and set the price for those at a level where 
even the person at the bottom can afford [Ikutha, Kenya, 
Retailers].
In Kenya, as in Mozambique, price controls from the pre-structural 
adjustment era of the 1970s and 80s were sometimes recalled 
nostalgically as means of controlling markets rigged in favour of the 
powerful. But there was no notable support for a government-run 
system of provisioning in general. This was true even in countries like 
Mozambique and India from which, with their various experiences 
of communist and socialist models, alternative visions of this kind 
might have been expected to emerge. In Mozambique, the rumble of 
protest was tinged with nostalgia for the austere fairness of a socialist 
age when access to food was managed through government ration 
shops. Yet the most positive memories were not of ‘Samora’s time’ 
but rather of Chissano’s: a period after economic liberalisation when 
food was more abundant and prices rose, but wages were at least 
able to keep pace. Even the Communist Party of Bangladesh-backed 
fair markets struggle in the northern district of Gaibandha was seen 
as about getting markets to work better for the masses rather than 
as they are currently seen to do, for the elites. 
There is an interesting ambivalence here worth mentioning: for at 
least some of these protest communities, engagement in markets, 
including food markets, has been partly liberating. This may be 
particularly true for marginalised or excluded groups (for instance, 
the adivasis in Madhya Pradesh), for whom food rights may in the 
past have depended more entirely on patronage relations coloured 
by primordial affiliations like ethnicity or caste or religion. The 
ambivalence of marginalised groups towards their dependence 
on food markets for basic subsistence comes across in both how 
women garment workers in Dhaka are viewed and in how they 
themselves discuss their motivations for protest (See Fraser 2011a). 
These women have experienced both the commoditisation of 
their rights to food and the liberation from the patriarchal bargain 
that fed them in the past. Their rights to food were rooted in rural 
family structures where they were fed (sometimes reluctantly and 
with weaker rights than their brothers or husbands) as daughters, 
daughters-in-law, wives and eventually, as mothers. Now they earn 
independently, (unfairly low, sometimes unpredictable) cash wages 
to feed themselves and their dependants in a volatile food economy. 
It is arguably not the trading of food for cash that matters here: people 
have a right to earn a living from food production, and where these 
issues were explored, we heard considerable sympathies for the 
constraints facing small farmers. Even urban consumers struggling 
to buy food recognised that food producers need to make a decent 
living – and that their production systems were also skewed in favour 
of grain traders, speculators and food business interests. So while 
not fundamentally anti-market with respect to the food trade, these 
struggles display a deep suspicion of market actors and market 
operations as rarely free and usually unfair. Because food markets 
are a) rigged in favour of the powerful and b) so very important 
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to people on low and precarious incomes, they are in particularly 
urgent need of regulation. Food markets need to be tamed and 
subordinated - or socialised, as (Holt-Giménez and Patel 2012) have 
argued - to serve their primary purpose (that they feed the people 
before earning unfair profits). 
Although the immediate action required did not in every case point 
to the action of central government in the first instance, the authority 
of the state in making new or enforcing existing rules is implied. 
Expectations of the central state varied widely across the contexts. 
For indigenous  communities in the case study in Madhya Pradesh 
in India, the role of the state as bearing the responsibility for the 
realisation of the right to food was something that not many of them 
were conscious of before the Right to Food groups pointed this out. 
The moral economy there had until recent times been formulated 
within the customary relations of agricultural land tenure and labour 
arrangements. Engagement with the Movement and the state 
raised their expectations of it with respect to the protection of their 
subsistence rights. Similarly, we see in the protests by Bangladesh’s 
garments workers a shift in the locus of responsibility for the 
protection of their food security from families and communities to the 
state, which is mandated to set minimum wages at a level at which 
subsistence is possible. 
In both India and Bangladesh, however, the public authorities accept, 
to a significant degree, that they have such a role. It is notable that in 
Kenya, protests expressing moral claims to unga (maize meal) at a 
time of steep price rises largely fell on deaf ears; there was little or no 
sign that the moral economy of the Kenyan protestors was shared by 
the Kenyan political elite. Even protestors recognised that their rights 
were contingent on their identity and affiliation, noting that when ‘our 
(from our ethnic group) president’ was in power, help was available. 
In Mozambique, by contrast, there was no ethnic dimension to 
the protests, and neither were there accusations of party-political 
discrimination – not least because the riots were most widespread 
in the Frelimo heartland of Southern Mozambique, where Maputo is 
located. The rioters framed their discontent in class terms: the ‘them 
and us’ element articulated in text messages and rap songs and 
echoed by focus group participants in poor neighbourhoods Maputo 
referred to a corrupt and self-centred elite that wilfully neglected the 
claims of the hard-working poor.
Since this President Guebuza came in, things have been 
expensive. Even wages are falling (…) There’s a lot of 
wealth, but they’re eating it. Just that little group! (…) No 
one else gets anything.
[Focus group participant in Chamanculo, Maputo]
The eruptions that studded these rumbling politics during the 
volatile 2007-12 period can be seen as efforts to contest failures or 
to establish or reaffirm the terms of the compact on the protection 
of subsistence during shocks. This worked, to greater and lesser 
extent, in each setting. In that sense, the ‘food riots’ established 
or served to remind public authorities of their mandate for action 
in crisis moments. Many of the actions then taken were short-lived 
or tokenistic. But they signalled an acceptance of responsibility. 
Another way of saying this is that these are efforts to establish a 
generalised accountability for protection of subsistence; this tends to 
be articulated most clearly when contesting the earning of immoral 
and/or illegal rents from, or during, crisis conditions.
Timing and triggers: political opportunities and 
moments
These comments on the ideological content of contemporary politics 
of provisions only go so far in their explanation of why people 
protested at this time, at this place, and to what effect. To get deeper 
into this matter, we learn from our case studies that it is necessary 
to understand how the wider context – the food price situation in 
particular – interacted with and gave rise to specific triggers.
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In terms of timeframe, we lack a clear picture of the universe of food-
related protests in these countries even for this period: our research 
quickly uncovered the limitations of relying on media sources for 
even the most basic event counts analysis (see Tilly 2008). Assuming 
media outlets are consistently biased, however, we believe we have 
developed a sketch of the overall prevalence of the most prominent 
food-related protests during 2007-12 in these countries. We have a 
far firmer grasp of the protests and struggles for which we undertook 
in-depth analysis. Combining our (biased media-sourced) political 
events catalogue quantitative data with our qualitative explorations, 
we were able to arrive at some key conclusions about the type and 
nature of the protests, and what they mean. 
Food-related protests and organising were by no means common, 
even during the febrile days of 2008. Subsistence protests – protests 
with food or other aspects of basic needs or rights at issue - were 
considerably rarer than other more ‘political’ kinds of protest: 
partisan, communal, ethnic. Yet they were notably more common at 
moments of peak prices: the association seems reasonably clear. 
The significance of these protests does not lie in their frequency, but 
in their timing and the clarity of the signal they send about popular 
discontent. Arguably, it is precisely because people rarely come out 
on the streets to protest threats to their basic needs that these derive 
their power: they announce a very serious breach of the basic terms 
of the social contract. 
Our in-depth analyses revealed that protests were generally linked 
to wider movements or prior struggles which pre- and post-dated the 
2007-12 period on which we focused. In Mozambique, the key trigger 
of the 2008 and 2010 protests was not food price rises per se but 
the simultaneous hikes in the prices of bread and of urban transport 
– the chapa, whose rising cost had triggered rioting as far back as 
1994. This highlights that the price spikes, while dramatic, were far 
from the only threat to subsistence people were experiencing at this 
time, and/or which they were or able to organise around. It highlights 
that popular mobilisations have histories: a struggle around, for 
instance, taxes on retail food, may be traced to earlier organisation 
around fertilizer subsidies or agricultural price-fixing. Protests about 
corruption in public food distribution recalls past opposition to similar 
scandals. A right-to-food movement represents a maturing of earlier 
periods of mobilisation and protest against food injustice.
Inevitably, across the five year period in the study, political 
competition and transition was a feature of these political events. In 
West Bengal, for instance, the political opportunity structure within 
which the ‘ration riots’ kicked off against the backdrop of the Singur/
Nandigram agitations against land acquisition and included calls 
for regime paribartan – change in state government. Meanwhile in 
northern Bangladesh, small farmers and traders took the opportunity 
of the hiatus in ‘political government’ to take legal control of the 
local market from the erstwhile lease-holders, with their strong 
party political connections. In Maputo, the food and fuel riots were 
themselves implicated in the shift in urban politics away from the 
ruling party. It is not clear that any generalizable messages can 
be drawn from how these diverse patterns of political competition 
influenced the timing of these protests, other than that they afforded 
protestors the chance to embarrass incumbents and speak to future 
rulers – i.e. that democratic transitions create a (usually) regularly 
re-created political opportunity structure. 
The global price spikes themselves, and the inflationary trend that 
came with them, were contextual factors that created the conditions 
under which specific triggers kicked off events. Yet Mozambique is 
the only case in which the price rises per se ‘caused’ protests, and 
this was only because of the combination of the country’s unique 
dependence on imports for both the key urban staple (wheat flour) 
and the fuel needed to run urban transport with the government’s 
crass decision to bundle multiple internationally-driven cost 
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increases into a single package of domestic price hikes. In India, 
the main struggle for the Right to Food and the policy response to 
that national movement were entirely delinked from the global food 
situation, as this was not seen as an important dimension of the 
headline debates about hunger and food in India. In Bangladesh, 
rural struggles resonated with and drew on older, bigger struggles 
around agriculture – over inputs, procurement, marketing, taxation. 
Protests appeared to occur at times when price rises were not being 
met by even the gestures of action by public authorities. It is important 
to note, of course, that states may be acting behind the scenes by, 
for instance, setting up new trade agreements, as the Government 
of Bangladesh did in 2009, or holding down the exchange rate to 
limit the domestic cost of imported food and fuel, as the Government 
of Mozambique did after the 2010 protests. But such actions were 
not always visible to people facing the prospect of perpetually rising 
prices. It seemed to be important to people that they were reassured 
that action was being taken, and would always be taken.
In all cases, as we saw above, specific events triggered the action by 
outraging public opinion, usually at times when prices were peaking. 
The moral economy was outraged when unchecked price rises were 
accompanied – or caused - by suspected or reported corruption, 
collusion or speculation, withheld wages (protected by state security 
forces), subsidy cuts or price hike announcements. 
Protestors and grievances
From our events catalogues it seems that protest groups were 
predominantly, but not exclusively urban; this tallies with the evidence 
and the assumptions of most other studies on these issues. However, 
we should also note that national media are more likely to report 
urban (capital city) protests; this was the case in particular for Kenya 
and Bangladesh in our study. 
Rural protests also occurred but these were typically driven more by 
concerns of food production – subsidies, distribution of agricultural 
inputs, marketing or public procurement – and so were not always 
directly relevant to our core concerns about food consumption, with 
the exception of food aid distribution in drought-prone Northern 
Kenya and flood-hit Southern Mozambique. However, some, like 
the fair markets campaign in northern Bangladesh, focused on the 
governance of food marketing, and so united concerns about both 
the production of food and its consumption. Depending on how the 
events were reported and labelled, some of these types of rural 
struggle were identified during our search process. Looked at closely, 
conventional assumptions of a conflict of or opposed interests 
between (urban) consumers and (rural) producers in relation to food 
policy is not borne out in practice: even urban consumers recognise 
that small rural farmers are not the primary beneficiaries of higher 
prices, and a suspicion that traders and market intermediaries are 
the main winners of food crises appears to be common across many 
contexts (Hossain and Kalita 2014). In Mozambique, the rural poor 
are net food purchasers too, as their harvests are rarely sufficient to 
ensure year-round subsistence; they suffer from rising input costs 
when they try to produce their own food, and from rising prices when 
they must buy food from others.
That said, there are systematic differences between urban and 
rural protests. Urban people had typically more commodified 
relationships to food than rural people: many protestors shared the 
fact that their realisable rights to food depended more completely 
on their purchasing power than in the past. Many were recent urban 
migrants, with weaker ties to the land, as well as wage workers on 
low and precarious incomes. Urban low income groups often lack 
access to social protection programmes, which, under aid regimes, 
are often tightly poverty-targeted (but insensitive to vulnerability). 
And customary or informal safety nets that may operate in rural 
areas tend to be weak or absent for urban migrants. These groups 
are rarely among the poorest and may not be worst off when food 
prices rise or scarcities occur, but their precariousness is particularly 
well revealed by commodity price shocks. (It should also be noted 
that the rural poor in all four countries are net consumers of food – 
even those who farm buy more than they grow).
Low income urban migrants also tend to be spatially concentrated 
and united by common occupational concerns. In Kenya, for instance, 
the People’s Parliament, Bunge la Mwananchi, drew its energy 
from its ward chapters in Nairobi’s slum communities to mount its 
campaign for an Unga (maize flour) Revolution. Just outside Dhaka, 
the garments workers usually organised (typically peaceful) protests 
at the factory level, but bigger protests were easily organised across 
factories by mobilisers jumping onto buses used by garments 
workers to spread the word. One way of understanding what these 
groups had in common at this time was that their relationships to 
state and society, and the claims they reasonably make to protect 
their subsistence, were in flux. Their willingness to organise reflects 
their need to reaffirm or renegotiate their rights to protection, as urban 
residents without strong claims on their communities or established 
rights as citizens.
Our research did not uncover any consistent gendered patterns of 
protest. In all cases, it is recognised that women and children bear 
the brunt of food price rises in terms of impacts on consumption and 
longer-term effects on nutrition and health. This relates to customs 
that dictate women usually eat last (in South Asia), gendered patterns 
of unpaid care work (for which women are largely responsible in 
all four countries), and gender segmentation in labour markets so 
that women are more likely to be involved in home-based or low-
paid self-employed activities than formal sector jobs. Women can be 
particularly hard-pressed to cope when food prices rise, as women 
from dalit and indigenous communities in the village of Chitehara in 
Madhya Pradesh explained:
I have not got a [ration] card also. I do not get anything 
from the quota (PDS). I just labour out and buy my 
food from the market. Sometimes I go to the jungle 
for plucking leaves and collecting mahua [a tree with 
multiple food and fuel uses]. At times we go hungry for 
the day altogether. 
The day I go to Satna, my children remain hungry in 
the house waiting for me to return with the food. If the 
collected wood is confiscated then I have to come back 
to borrow some grains from the local shop on credit. 
Such food is very carefully rationed to everyone with a 
lot of water to make it last longer. 
Reading these testimonies, it is unsurprising that the poorest women, 
who are hardest hit by food crises, are unlikely to take to the streets: 
they may not have the time to protest, or the capacity to risk arrest 
or violence, and may depend on not being seen as ‘trouble-makers’ 
by the local elite. 
In some of the research contexts we found that both women and 
men participated in protests, albeit not in equal numbers or always 
in the same ways. In Maputo, several focus group participants 
remarked on the presence of ‘mothers’ as well as (male) ‘youths’ 
on the improvised barricades that had brought the city to a standstill 
in 2010. In West Bengal, the highly violent ration riots, involving 
brick-throwing and rubber bullets, involved local men only. On at 
least one occasion, however, local women formed a human chain 
to stand between the men and the police and prevent violence. In 
Dhaka, the predominantly female garments industry featured violent 
episodes in which women lead and bore the brunt of attacks.7 Yet 
considering the predominance of women workers in the sector as 
a whole (around 80 per cent), the visible involvement of young men 
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suggests that men may have been disproportionately involved. This 
is impressionistic rather than factual and builds on what workers told 
us about patterns of protest. If men were disproportionately involved, 
this may reflect gendered patterns of behaviour less than gender 
segmentation within the RMG labour market: men are concentrated 
within knitwear, which by its seasonal nature has different and 
more ‘flexible’ working conditions, in which workers are essentially 
temporary contractors. 
In other contexts, such as the Gaibandha fair markets struggles 
in north Bangladesh, class and gender interacted to shape who 
protested and how. There, Communist Party members related how 
their wives and daughters supported the struggle, while the less 
educated wives and daughters of the small farmers and traders with 
whom we spoke knew little of the struggle in which their men were 
involved. The perception among these men was that rural women 
lacked the education to understand the purpose of their movement 
and so were best left uninformed. 
It may be less the gender roles of female protestors which are of 
interest here than those of the men. Some men commented on the 
impact of the food price rises on their breadwinning roles as fathers 
or as sons, indicating that this was a source of considerable stress 
(see also Kelbert and Hossain 2014).
The grievances around which people explicitly articulated their 
protests were greatly more varied than a ‘food riot’ would suggest. 
What the international media termed ‘food riots’ in Bangladesh at 
this time were primarily wage-related protests by garments workers 
and some other protests by low income urban groups. The 2008 riots 
there were unequivocally around higher wages and other labour 
rights (correctly recognised as the key issue by the Bangladeshi 
media), but they politicised their demands as due to their inability 
to afford basic foods, using the slogan, ‘reduce prices, let us live’ 
(which the Bangladeshi media ignored, possibly because it made 
their protests more sympathetic). In Mozambique, the increase in 
urban transport (chapa) prices was as widely-cited as the hike in the 
cost of bread as the initial trigger for riots in both 2008 and 2010; 
elsewhere, farmers and consumers were similarly aggrieved about 
rising costs of fertilizer and irrigation and the implications for incomes 
and costs of living. 
For these reasons, protests sought official action. This often amounted 
to demands to take action against market actors – food traders, 
merchants and intermediaries, shopkeepers, and market officials – 
to control retail prices or protect producer prices, prevent hoarding 
or speculation in times of dearth or to ensure correct distribution of 
subsidies and transfers. In Maputo, a fresh round of rioting in 2012 
was averted in part because the government promised to clamp 
down on ‘route-shortening’, the practice by which chapa operators 
stopped short of their official destination and gave passengers the 
choice of continuing on foot or paying for a second ticket to continue 
the journey. Demands for official action could also target government 
policies, in particular subsidy cuts, regulatory failures, meagre social 
protection transfers or protection of business interests over those of 
consumers. 
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ChAnnelS OF 
DISCOnTenT
Channels through which people might legitimately (and without resort 
to violence or unruly means) express their grievances were blocked 
or otherwise imperfect. The unruly means of the demonstration or 
road block or the risky strategy of riot appear to have a powerful 
impact in the absence of ideal conditions of democratic pluralism. 
But these protests and riots are patchily local, often poorly organised, 
and their achievements are often little more than short-lived populist 
responses, easily reversed or forgotten when matters quieten down. 
They are frequently disconnected from national organisations and 
networks, let alone the international groups that might give them heft. 
That Kenya’s Bunge la Mwananchi has to date not been effectively 
linked up to global right-to-food movements highlights this point 
particularly well. 
Eating and the body politic
One route through which food discontent can be articulated is 
invoking shared cultural and social values around food. Food has a 
special status in political discourse above and beyond its material and 
nutritional value, and the metaphors and symbols of food and eating 
give protests a particularly embodied power. The outrage inspired 
by powerful groups profiting from the hunger of others was a familiar 
theme, and metaphors of ‘eating’ in relation to corruption relate 
to this sense of outrage at greed. Kenyan protestors were highly 
exercised by new taxes on basic foods at a time when politicians had 
awarded themselves large pay increases and allowances: there, the 
perception of the callous neglect by the ruling elite was a spur to 
protest. The view of one unnamed protestor in Kenya in 2011 was 
that “[t]hey cannot eat when we are not eating” – the clear imperative 
being that food must be shared. 
“You are what you eat” takes on a powerful political meaning in such 
contexts. For the garments workers in Bangladesh, rice, the very 
constitutive substance of the Bangladeshi body, was unaffordable 
at times. They noted this with shame. At the peak of the 2008 crisis, 
the Bangladeshi Army Chief General Moeen U. Ahmed, became 
a figure of fun at home and abroad when he put the Bangladeshi 
Army on potato rations (2008 was a bumper potato crop); he also 
used his position as the military backer of the unelected Caretaker 
Government to advise the nation as a whole to eat less rice, even 
sharing his recipes for potato dishes.8
People’s views about food price rises were also formulated in light 
of what they meant for their wellbeing beyond the bare calculus 
of cost: rising prices could mean an inability to feed families or a 
need to resort to bad or low status foods, which is a source of social 
shame and emasculation of men in their role as breadwinners. The 
riots in West Bengal were triggered by an inability to afford wheat 
(not a staple) in the market by the slightly better off, thus striking at 
their sense of status. In Mozambique, prices of many foodstuffs rose 
but the one whose increased cost triggered rioting was bread: an 
overwhelmingly urban staple, made from imported wheat (obtained 
both on the international market and via food aid) that is supplied to 
bakeries whose prices are under tight government control. Bread 
is usually eaten on its own or as a sandwich with a leaf of cabbage 
or slice of tomato – eggs, fish or chicken were considered rare and 
increasingly unaffordable luxuries in our study areas. The traditional 
rural diet, based on maize and cassava, is rejected for both aesthetic 
and practical reasons: it is seen as rustic and unsophisticated, and 
also requires expensive charcoal and scarce time to cook. Bread, on 
the other hand, can be eaten as soon as it is bought, and is also a 
symbolic marker of urban modernity. Food is also cultural and social, 
and the sharing of food habits a political matter, confirming that people 
do not view food as merely fuel for bodies. If an embodied feeling 
of shame around something as elemental as food can drive people 
to mobilise, this may help to explain why people can be angered 
by food price rises even though they are not, in the medium-term, 
materially or nutritionally worse off as a result. 
Representation
There is in general a gap of representation when it comes to low-
income urban groups. A key question here is where and how have the 
interests of such groups been effectively represented without resort to 
dependence on vote banks and patronage. For instance, consumer 
rights groups, which might have been expected to take an interest 
in food marketing, were nowhere found to be working alongside 
organisations of low-income urban groups. Callous insistence on 
raising MP’s salaries at a time when ordinary Kenyans were hungry 
meant there were no obvious targets for these grievances. As one 
man in a focus group of butchers and kiosk-owners put it:
As the Members of Parliament are fighting for [an 
increase in] their salaries, where do you think that money 
is coming from? It will come from the increased cost of 
flour. When they tax those kinds of goods, it is going to 
them. They are the ones who are supposed to help us, 
but with how they are behaving, who will we cry to?
In Bangladesh and Mozambique, where the right to food is not 
constitutionally mandated in any specific or legally enforceable 
sense, party politics played some role in channelling discontent. A 
small number of actions and protests were staged by opposition 
parties in Bangladesh and India, highlighting the failures and neglect 
of the incumbent. These were never very prominent or important, 
which in Bangladesh reflected the general closeness between the 
two main parties on the issues of food security and social protection 
policies. The impression these party political protests leave is of token 
recognition of the hardships being faced, and a somewhat feeble 
effort to make political capital from it. By contrast, in Mozambique, 
the government’s handling of the food and fuel crisis and riots 
intensified a sense of alienation from Frelimo that opened the way for 
the opposition MDM party to enjoy unprecedented electoral success 
in urban areas – but neither the MDM nor its fellow opposition party 
Renamo internalised the question of urban food insecurity enough to 
make it a consistent focus of their policy platforms. 
The contrast between the right-to-food movements of India and 
Kenya help to highlight the difference between a situation in which the 
channels are relatively functional, and one in which they are blocked 
by the political economy of food policy. A key difference between the 
two is the relative receptiveness of the Indian Government to the 
institutionalisation of rights to food, chiefly articulated in relation to 
food subsidies and entitlements. The contrasting situation in Kenya 
is one in which large maize farmer and mill-owning interests are 
powerfully positioned to oppose any action that they perceive as 
reducing the protection they enjoy in regional staple food markets. 
But nor has the Kenyan Government yet felt the imperative to 
expand its new and still tiny Hunger Safety Nets Programme and 
similar social protection schemes to cover more than a fraction of 
those facing hunger. In India, failure to protect against food crises is 
an electoral disaster. In Kenya, electoral success is largely unrelated 
to food crisis; in any case, drought-related famine attracts huge 
international donor funds and intervention, muddying the lines of 
accountability for hunger. 
It is possible that a social movement broader than Bunge la Mwananchi 
might be successful in such a context, yet there are no signs of any 
receptiveness on the part of the Kenyan government to efforts to 
hold them to account for food shocks. Social movements and civil 
society organisations grow and learn and are encouraged by their 
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successes. The Indian movement is a broad church: vast, networked 
from global to local, supported and reported on by the mass media, 
and with the achievements of an Act of Parliament and a series of 
operational schemes to show. Without some successes it is not clear 
how the still-new Kenyan movement can sustain momentum. In the 
meantime, as one policymaker said when asked what would push 
them to act: “we would quickly come up with something if Kibera [a 
Nairobi slum] was burning” – the riot may be the most effective piece 
in the repertoire. 
Organised civil society in the sense of donor-supported NGOs and 
groups were weak as channels for discontent for these groups. In 
Mozambique, it was clear that aid-financed ‘astro-turf’ civil society 
actors had been failing to listen to the voice of the street, and were 
as surprised as the government by the upsurge of protests. Donor 
dependence for funding can mean donor ideas about how markets 
should work displace popular understandings and priorities. In 
Mozambique, the ‘Food Sovereignty Network’ set up by international 
NGOs with multilateral and bilateral donor support failed to 
achieve any visibility among poor urban Mozambicans, and failed 
ignominiously in its effort to push right-to-food legislation through 
Parliament. Aid financing was not notable in either the Kenyan or 
the Indian Right to Food movements, for better or for worse, and 
international NGOs were not found to be playing a prominent role 
in supporting protestors. Some international NGOs in Kenya and 
national NGOs and think-tanks in Bangladesh attempted to raise the 
profile of concerns about food price rises through research, dialogue 
and advocacy work. But it is not clear to what extent protestors were 
able to access or use these channels to voice their grievances, and 
they may instead have been shaped more directly by the concerns 
of civil society organisations. Civil society modes of organising, 
particularly those amenable to aid donor financing, were generally 
at odds with the market-skeptical fury of food-related protests 
at this time. These concerns were more amply addressed by the 
organisational modes and state engagements of Partha Chatterjee’s 
‘political society’ (Chatterjee 2011; Chatterjee 2004).
Communicating and amplifying discontent
The mass media is the single most important means of amplifying 
popular discontent about food. But media biases and limitations 
frequently distort the message. These biases can systematically 
block the recognition of the scale and nature of discontent. They also 
mean most research on protest, based as it is on media coverage for 
its observations, is similarly biased and flawed. In Mozambique, for 
example, the weight of government influence over the media tended 
to stifle public debate; even the private TV channel STV, which 
won plaudits for running uncensored footage of the 2010 riots, was 
browbeaten into muting its coverage by the time discontent began to 
bubble up again in 2012 over a fresh round of price rises. 
The political events catalogue that we developed in India through a 
review of two leading national-level newspapers showed 59 events 
related to political mobilisations on the issues of food rights during the 
period 2007-2012. Out of these reported events, 31 events were led/
mobilised by the national political parties, mainly the main opposition 
Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
(aka the CPM). The Right to Food movement in India has been 
crucial to mobilisations around food and has been a central actor in 
policy advocacy and formulation with the state – to a much greater 
extend than mainstream political parties, especially the BJP. Thus, 
the popular mobilisations that were recorded in the political events 
catalogue were not the spaces/platform through which constructive 
engagement on the issue of food rights between the policymakers 
and the people emerged. The mechanisms of contributing to policy 
formulations ‘from below’ seem to have lied elsewhere. This shows 
that the Indian media reports provide a very limited and, in fact, 
skewed understanding of processes of mobilisation relating to 
food provisioning. In Bangladesh, news outlets covered protests 
selectively, depending on their audience. So the newspaper which 
had a wider rural readership tended to cover reports of farmer 
protests in relation to issues of food production such as access 
to quality seeds, fuels, subsidy etc., whereas newspapers with a 
primarily urban audience often neglected these events altogether.
Many of the ways in which popular discontent is articulated – through 
jokes, songs, street graffiti or online memes – are never picked up 
by the print or broadcast media at all. Even the outspoken stand 
of the high-profile Mozambican rapper Azagaia was only reported 
after he was taken in for questioning on suspicion of encouraging 
the protests in 2010 – more than two years after his song ‘Povo no 
Poder’ (‘Power to the People’), composed as a tribute to the 2008 
rioters, had become a favourite ringtone on the mobile phones of 
rebellious urban youth.
We’re not fooled any more by the same old story
We’re coming out to fight the scum
The thieves
The corrupt ones
Shout along with me for this lot to get out
Shout along with me because the people have given up 
crying
(…)
This is Maputo, no one really knows how it happened
The people who yesterday were sleeping, today are 
wide awake
All because of the miserable salary you pay
The people are leaving their homes and smashing the 
first window they see 
Because the cost of transport has gone up
The cost of bread has gone up
 (…)
Mr President, you left the luxury of your palace
You finally noticed that life’s not easy here
Only now did you call a meeting of your Council of 
Ministers
But the people haven’t been sleeping, we came together 
a long time ago
We’ve barricaded the streets
We’ve halted the minibuses
No one is getting past
Even the shops are shut
If the police are violent
We’ll respond with violence
Azagaia, ‘Power to the People’ (Portuguese lyrics from http://www.
vagalume.com.br/azagaia/povo-no-poder.html – our translation).
However, riots were capable of rendering the urban poor visible to 
policymakers, establishing their political importance as consumers, 
urban residents, and political actors. This expanded the scope and 
arena for state action, carving out a new role for states in protecting 
the urban poor. For the garments workers of Bangladesh, for 
instance, we argue that while their 2008 and later protests may not 
have had much influence on food policy, they raised the profile of a 
group who historically has not received any state protection from food 
insecurity. They were predominantly young, predominantly female, 
often rural migrants without husbands or fathers in charge. After this 
period, we can see that the Government has more fully accepted 
its role in protecting this group from food insecurity – although it 
remains hesitant in its dealings with their employers, and whose low 
pay scales are the primary problem. 
The research also helped reaffirm that the media, in its contemporary 
form, becomes an active participant in the unfolding of a riot, and 
ceases to be an external observer. In Mozambique, the media 
extensively covered the issue of rise of prices of particular goods 
and services prior to the riots. The eruption of riots in Maputo meant 
that the media immediately identified this price rise as the cause. 
The discourses employed by the media in covering these riots – 
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the labelling of the 2008 riots as ‘fuel riots’ and the 2010 riots as 
‘bread riots’ – glossed over other fundamental grievances of the 
protesters. However, this articulation of the media influenced not 
just an external audience, but came to be inscribed in the rioters’ 
own perceptions and discourses, and also of those who were to 
join the revolts at a later stage. Similarly in Bangladesh, journalists 
revealed that the media exaggerated virtually all food related public 
gatherings as food ‘protests’. For instance, a large queue of people 
waiting to purchase subsidised rice from a government safety 
net programme was reported as an agitation for essential goods. 
Several such instances were narrated by journalists. The media is 
thus firmly embedded in and integral to the mechanisms through 
which a political event emerges and unfolds. The fact that the media 
was an ideological actor and a conscious participant in the process 
of mobilisation complicates how we read and understand the data 
generated by an events catalogue. 
menuS OF OFFICIAl 
reSPOnSe
Price rises and volatilities since 2007 have highlighted the extreme 
complexities of food price changes, and the challenges faced by 
governments in delivering appropriate responses to them. Several of 
these challenges were extrinsic to their political motivations, such as 
the exchange rate in Mozambique, or the behaviour of rice-exporters 
for the Bangladesh Government. Yet these price rises and volatilities 
have also vividly dramatized the divergent moral and political 
economic logics with which food security policies are formulated. 
While the former have been studied reasonably closely, the latter 
have not. There is by now a large literature on the nature and 
impact of the policy responses to the 2008 and 2010 shocks, which 
it is not our intention to reproduce here.9 Our research objectives 
steer us in the direction of the moral and political economies of the 
response, and so we continue here with our focus on the thinking 
and pressures underlying the responses, as recreated for us by 
policymakers, advisors and scholars. In particular we are interested 
in whether, and the extent to which, the popular mobilisation of the 
period could be said to have increased – and more importantly, to 
have institutionalised – accountability for hunger.
Accountability for hunger
What do we mean by accountability for hunger? We consider policy 
responses to have resulted in institutionalised accountability when 
there is a functional system through which people at risk of hunger 
can effectively hold public authorities to account for failures to 
protect them from hunger. Adapting from (Goetz and Jenkins 2005), 
we understand this to depend on:
•	 Clarity of mandate, broadly, understanding of rights and 
responsibilities for food security
•	 Standards against which performance can be judged
•	 Monitoring, or an information system that keeps policymakers 
aware of the risks of hunger and its performance for 
preventing it
•	 Enforcement, or the means for sanctioning failures to protect 
food security 10
The establishment of a legal, enforceable right to food is the clearest 
indication that accountability for hunger has been institutionalised, 
and in both India and Kenya, the period of our study saw important 
advances in this respect. In India, the National Food Security Act was 
passed in 2013, while Kenya’s 2010 Constitution enshrined the right 
to food, and was followed by the National Food Security and Social 
Protection policies in 2011, and a Social Protection Review in 2012 
which focused on the very many shortcomings of the new policies 
with respect to budget, coverage and leakage. Much remains to be 
seen as to how these laws and policies will be operationalised, but in 
principle, these clearly set out the mandate of the state with respect 
to food. In India, the issues of standards, monitoring systems and 
enforcement have all been set out under the law. In Kenya, the new 
policies do not set standards and monitoring remains piecemeal 
and often externally-dependent (the World Food Programme plays 
a significant role in hunger monitoring in Kenya, as it does in other 
countries experiencing acute and chronic food insecurity problems, 
including Mozambique). 
In neither Mozambique nor Bangladesh did the period conclude with 
any stronger legal or mandatory provisions for protection against 
hunger. As noted above, a donor-funded attempt to stimulate a right-
to-food movement in Mozambique faltered before it had even got close 
to securing legislation. In Bangladesh, such a movement remains at 
the conceptual stage, along with claims to most other economic and 
social rights. In Bangladesh, however, official readiness to cope with 
price spikes has greatly increased with the establishment of new trade 
arrangements with southeast Asian neighbours, and in particular 
with increased food grain storage capacity to enable a larger grain 
reserve with which to both stabilise prices and finance social safety 
nets. It is an open secret in the Dhaka elite that the 2007-08 military-
backed Caretaker Government lost popularity because it could not 
tame the price of rice. Regardless of whether such criticism is fair, it 
serves as a reminder that legitimacy and public support is ultimately 
dependent on performance on the dal-bhat issues that matter the 
most. 
In Mozambique, a large number of policy responses took the form of 
a headline-grabbing announcement followed by failure to deliver; our 
focus group participants and interviewees in poor neighbourhoods of 
Maputo  succinctly labelled such policies as mentiras – literally, ‘lies’. 
In 2008, for example, the government not only announced a ‘Food 
Production Action Plan’ designed to raise wheat production five-fold 
within three years, but also a plan to produce bread not from wheat 
but from cassava, in which Mozambique is self-sufficient. Neither 
the wheat or the cassava bread materialised; wheat production 
flat-lined, and although cassava production did increase, the 
surplus was mostly absorbed by a South African-owned firm that 
was experimenting with brewing cassava-based beer. Similarly, the 
government announced in 2008 that it would be building a network 
of grain storage facilities across the country to hold strategic stocks 
that could be released onto the market whenever prices started to 
spike; four years later, only two of the proposed 39 silos had been 
built. 
Aside from the food and transport price freezes, the highest-profile 
policy response to the 2010 riots was the President’s announcement 
that a ‘Basic Basket’ of foodstuffs would be made available to the 
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urban poor at subsidised prices – but in the absence of any concrete 
measures to implement an eligibility registration system or set up 
a distribution network, this soon came to be characterised as yet 
another mentira.
Thus, what we have seen is one country in which accountability for 
hunger has undeniably been strengthened in legal and organisational 
terms (India); a second in which the mandate has been claimed but 
little else has yet advanced (Kenya); a third in which the mandate has 
been effective but not enshrined in law – and so not a full right in any 
meaningful sense (Bangladesh) and a fourth in which no mandate 
has even been formally acknowledged and a failure to deliver on 
more strategic policy responses has further undermined the ruling 
party’s credibility (Mozambique). In this last case, the government 
nevertheless feels obliged to continue with the short-term measures 
it has been using to moderate the impact of price increases on the 
urban poor. 
To what extent did popular mobilisation cause or trigger or even 
contribute to these important changes in food policy? It is genuinely 
difficult to answer this question in a robust way. Some policymakers 
admitted freely that some specific policy choices were made in the 
heated atmosphere of protests, actual or anticipated. But the kinds of 
actions plainly dictated by fear of protest – for instance, the botched 
decision to subsidise maize milling in Kenya in late 2008 or the basic 
basket ‘lie’ offered up as a response to Mozambique’s protests in 
2010 – were often not only populist but also poorly conceived, short 
lived and counter-productive. In India, it is conceivable to trace the 
links between the Right to Food campaign and the passage of the 
Right to Food Act, but it is an exception to the rule. 
However, significant policy changes were also made with more 
enduring and positive results for food security, and they too occurred 
in this unsettled atmosphere with the promise of riot or at least 
protest hanging heavy in the air. Did this miasma of food discontent 
influence food policy? It seems unlikely that it failed to influence it 
at all, even if some policymakers and officials sought to deny such 
an influence. Many policymakers and officials appeared reasonably 
well-informed – more knowledgeable and more sympathetic than 
we had hypothesised – about the conditions of hunger and food 
insecurity in general, and specifically about the impacts of the food 
price spikes and inflation on the wellbeing of the population. Protests 
cast a spotlight on the discontent, but the script was anyway being 
rehearsed in the grumbles of everyday life, at bus stops, in markets, 
at home. During this period, high officials in the Ministry of Food 
in Bangladesh were said to occasionally send ranking bureaucrats 
out into local markets to hear what people were saying about food 
prices.11 A senior Kenyan official said: 
When we talk of resilience, it is not a good thing...In the case 
of the urban poor, it is likely they will survive, but under what 
cost? Children malnourished and underdeveloped, diseases 
and all.
The effects of these protests are to help re-establish the mandate 
for public authorities to act in crises, by raising expectations about 
what is expected. Officials and policymakers may hold very different 
views about roles and responsibilities than protestors, but this is 
part of the negotiation. The spectre of protest made it impossible 
for policymakers faced with the immensity of the global crisis as in 
2008 to ignore its human impacts. But they also clarified a view of 
the actions that active sections of the population felt strongly enough 
about to organise themselves to protest.
The protests also provide a rough reckoning of the impacts of crises 
and of the policy responses to them. While policymakers may have 
access to objective impact or price data on which to monitor events, 
these protests provide an indication of the kinds of people who are 
being affected, as well as of how programmes to protect people are 
operating, and who is being excluded from any support or protection. 
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To that extent, protests substitute for or supplement management 
information systems. Protests also provide a form of enforcement 
by way of sanctions. This is sometimes at the level of officialdom at 
which the protest is targeted – for instance, the Block Development 
Officer or zilla administrator in the West Bengal riots; failure to 
maintain law and order is the most egregious failure of the frontline 
administrative official, and so the riot serves as a highly effective 
signal. Reported internationally, the food riot is also a sanction against 
the national political leadership. As we learned in the early stages of 
our international media content analysis, the accusation of food riots 
is staunchly resisted by most elites, who prefer to see such events as 
more complex matters, often provoked by interested outsiders.12 To 
be known to have had food riots in your country is a matter of shame, 
a statement about your failure as a ruler to adequately feed your 
population – the governance equivalent of emasculating failure of the 
breadwinner to put meals on the table. Rulers who value and need 
their popular legitimacy (and most depend on this for the everyday 
success of their rule) will experience the food riot as a sanction in 
itself. By this assessment, protests about food, if communicated with 
reasonable accuracy, provide a rough mechanism for accountability 
in their own right.
Signs and symbols
Gestures matter: while some of the more knee-jerk responses may 
have had counter-productive or temporary effects, it is clear that 
some policy responses were intended to demonstrate the intention or 
willingness to protect people. Gestures are not ‘mere’ or ‘empty’ acts 
because they indicate a sense of shared hardship, and of common 
moral economy principles. They tell people that the authorities agree 
with them, and feel their pain. 
The acts themselves may refer to symbols – such as particular price 
levels or culturally sanctioned goods being protected, or at specific 
seasons. When a Kenyan policymaker explains that the Parliament 
or Cabinet sometimes declares that ‘maize meal should not get to 
one hundred shillings’ he is referring to the psychological limits of 
certain price levels. In some instances, governments were careful 
to avoid displays of lavish spending when people were facing rising 
prices, in order to downplay inequalities and avoid outraging popular 
feeling. President Guebuza, whose tendency to see government as 
a set of personal business opportunities had helped to make him 
the focus of much popular anger, ordered a freeze on Ministerial 
salaries as part of his package of responses to the 2010 protests 
in Mozambique. When he was Finance Minister, Uhuru Kenyatta, 
the current President of Kenya, ordered government officials to 
exchange their Mercedes Benz official cars for Toyota Passats to 
save on fuel. Some ministers’ resistance to this order was cited by 
protesters in May 2011 as a stark illustration of their callous attitude 
toward their hungry constituents. The West Bengal government 
decision to provide rice at Rs. 2 per kilo signalled that the government 
was aware of the need to respond, even though the riots were about 
wheat.
Many of the actions taken in 2008 were clearly intended to signal a 
willingness to protect one’s own people, even if it were at the expense 
of other nations. ‘Protectionism’ is a dirty word in international trade 
and neo-classical economic theory, yet its potent political significance 
is that it signals a willingness to protect struggling consumers even 
when by doing so, others suffer (surplus food producers at home, rice 
importers and consumers abroad). The Indian rice export ban, for 
instance, told the Indian people that their needs came before others’. 
Bangladeshi journalists commented that this backfired because the 
Government of Bangladesh relaxed restrictions on cross-border 
smuggling, so that international trade in effect continued under the 
radar, helping to keep the price of rice down in Bangladesh.13 
Banning food exports is a common demand of moral economies in 
many contexts. Other symbolic behaviours that respond to the moral 
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economy included displays of enforcement of price regulations 
for key food items, and noisy proclamations against profiteering, 
speculation, hoarding and cartels. Many of these also backfired, 
resulting in outcomes like mass private stockpiling in Bangladesh. 
The perceived insensitivity of the Mozambican government’s 
response during the initial phase of the 2010 protests – when 
Ministers described the protestors as ‘vandals’ and ‘bandits’ – made 
the population all the more inclined to categorise their subsequent 
policy responses as meaningless lies. It is clear that people judge 
officials’ responses to food price rises and protests in terms of both 
what they say and what they do.
Nourishing the imagined community
One hypothesis of the research was that the globalisation of the 
world food system would constrain the capacities of national 
governments to respond to popular demands. The food systems 
of small developing countries are more integrated with world trade 
than those in 18th century England, for instance. It is plausible, 
then, to suppose that a politics of provisions that functions to keep 
small developing countries food secure in the 21st century will 
need to be correspondingly in gear with globalisation. Specifically, 
in order to make a reasonable diagnosis of why they experience 
food insecurity, people would need to understand the influence of 
global market forces. At the same time, in order to make claims 
on their governments that had a realistic chance of improving their 
food situation, they would need to understand what is feasible: what 
kinds of responses are within their reach, affordable, technically or 
administratively manageable, and what kinds of effects might they 
achieve? 
In fact, the causes and complexities of the 2008 and 2010-11 food 
price spikes, volatility or inflation (depending on where you were) 
were poorly understood at the time, and to date continue to arouse 
debate and controversy. People who are neither professional trade 
economists nor food policy experts understandably do not always 
seek to grasp the deep causes of food crises, preferring instead to 
focus on proximate suspected causes. These are sometimes to do 
with disasters or crop failures etc., but more usually (in the case 
of 2008 in particular) appear to involve the belief that food price 
spikes are unnatural and therefore deliberate, created for profit by 
speculators and cartels. The likely role of global financial speculation 
in creating the 2008 price spike shows that moral economic logics 
can be applied to an integrated world food economy. 
However, we found that the referents for the moral economy and the 
targets for protestors’ demands and claims were mainly national. In 
some instances, as with the indigenous groups in Madhya Pradesh, 
this marked a shift upward, from the patronage of local and customary 
authorities to claiming rights in and demanding action by the central 
state. For garments workers, it was initially factory owners and 
only later enforcement of workers’ rights by the state that were the 
objects of their struggle. But on the whole, the right to food rested in 
membership of the national community, because it was as a citizen 
– as a member of the voting public in country X – that those rights 
could be realised. The prominence of the nation state in the moral 
economy of these populations makes sense, not least because of the 
protracted struggles each faced in achieving liberation from colonial 
rule, two of them having done so only within the last generation. 
In Mozambique’s case, the memory of anti-colonial struggle was 
overlaid with recollection of the post-independence socialist period, 
characterised by harsh austerity tempered by at least a rhetorical 
commitment to equality and social justice. This historical legacy 
makes state accountability a defining relation in contemporary moral 
economies. As the Indian case study states:
In other words, for the most part, patronage ties have been 
replaced by electoral accountabilities. This is reinforced by 
the fact that civil society mobilisation, under the auspices of 
the RTF campaign, has managed to create an environment 
where the state is seen as the solution to these issues. The 
state is the first port of call in contexts of hunger.
Food security is foundational for the state. The politics of food is 
a constitutive element of a polity and is extremely important for 
upholding legitimacy of a polity, especially if food has historically been 
important in how the state came into being. Hence, the discourse 
of shame features significantly in mobilisation around food. To be a 
functioning economy and state, you have to respond to food shocks. 
Food is an integral element of the social contract of citizens with 
state.
The weakness of the effort to institutionalise accountability for 
hunger in Kenya and Mozambique (compared to Bangladesh and 
India) draws attention to factors that have hampered or (in the case 
of Kenya) derailed the politics of provisions there. In both countries 
there are the complications of mass chronic hunger, a long drawn-out 
‘shock’ arising from climate change-related events such as Kenya’s 
drought and Mozambique’s floods, and the weight of dependence on 
aid for its management. In Kenya this was compounded by the shock 
and horror of the post-election violence; the inattention, perhaps 
wilful, of domestic and international media to subsistence protests, 
possibly mindful of the risks of inflaming conflict in this context; and 
the tribalisation of voter alignment. Arguably, a functional politics of 
provisions along the lines we have sketched are mutually constituted 
by “doorstep conditions” of a moderately stable and secure 
representative state structure (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2013).
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COnCluSIOnS 
Our most important findings across the cases are of a rumbling 
politics of provisions, captured at a moment when the rights and 
responsibilities around food were being re-negotiated and contested. 
These were being staged at different levels and velocities, and with 
differing lead actors and repertoires in each country, and yet their 
scripts bore common motifs. One story line that was repeatedly 
retold was around the morality of subsistence and the right to profit 
from hunger – timeless tales of power and authority over life and 
death. 
When we look into the backstories of these recently active 
movements and struggles, and situate them within their ideological 
and organisational heritage, it becomes clear that these politics of 
provisions are perennial or permanent struggles. They are not the 
momentary product of a price spike or period of price volatility, however 
dramatic that may have been. They are also deeply ideological and 
strategic, not the reflexive violence (wrongly) ascribed to the hungry. 
But they are also usually tacit. Because the politics of provisions are 
about the affirmation or contestation of shared assumptions about 
the rights and responsibilities of the public and the authorities at 
moments of subsistence crisis they can go unnoticed at other times, 
letting more contentious politics – election shenanigans, grand 
corruption, political violence – dominate the airwaves. The rumbles 
of the politics of provisions are only audible in the moments of crisis, 
and then too, usually only when crisis erupts in actual protests or 
riots in capital cities about prices (or rations, etc), which does not 
always happen. 
Scholars of food politics in history will be the first to note that we 
have not discovered something new here. It is, however, rare to be 
able to look so closely at these politics as they are in negotiation and 
rarer still for the protagonists to be able to recall their motivations 
with reasonable expectation of accuracy. Much of what we know 
about the politics of provisions comes from the historical analysis 
of food riots, and relies on archived accounts of dead people in 
societies long past. So while we have not uncovered some new form 
of politics, then, the timing of our looking has given us insights into 
the domestic moral and political economies that bind and motivate 
contemporary food policies. It has also given us some fresh ideas 
about what triggers the local eruptions that prompt re-negotiation at 
precisely these moments of global crisis. 
We started this work with the intention of answering what we 
thought was the key question at this time: did food riots – or popular 
mobilisation – increase accountability for hunger? We now think that 
we have answered this question: the answer is “yes – except for in 
Kenya.” But we have also understood more about the elements of 
our hypothesis, so that our “yes” does not mean that food riots forced 
policymakers into new provisions against hunger, in the simple linear 
model we had originally proposed. We now know much more about 
both the popular mobilisation and the official repertoires of response 
they elicit or interact with. We now think that popular mobilisations 
around subsistence are, in the absence of politer channels of 
discontent and at a time when ‘crisis’ is the new normal, vital parts 
of the machine of public accountability. Popular mobilisation mainly 
works when someone is listening and responding, so in a material 
sense, the reverse hypothesis may also be valid: that accountability 
causes popular mobilisation. 
All of this makes sense if you accept what we see as our main 
contribution to theorising the politics of food in the 21st century: that 
the politics of provisions are functional for (a minimal, negotiated 
degree of) food justice. This equilibrium position (notional) is the food 
security equivalent of stable national borders: of course there may be 
disputes with the big neighbour (some groups regularly face hungry 
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seasons), but on the whole, these are manageable and tolerable and 
accepted (those people cope and anyway are not all that important, 
politically). Based on our interpretation of how people argue the 
rights and responsibilities associated with food, we conclude that 
the state-society relation is founded upon, among other things, the 
assurance of a minimal degree of food justice. This is not food security 
precisely, but it comprises both a sense of assured access and the 
more political notion of fairness. And our focus is less on the terms of 
any social contract than on the perennial negotiation, affirmation and 
contestation involved in a functional politics of provisions. 
Our work looks at the ruptures in those politics, at the moments when 
their functionality is no longer fit for the conditions (and food markets 
are evolving fast) and/or when the terms of the agreement are in flux 
or dispute. We theorise that five collective beliefs combine to create 
the conditions for a rupture in the form of a food riot or subsistence 
protest: 
I. We face hunger, while – or because - others profit (this makes 
the point about fairness, not just physiological hunger);
II. Food is special, nourishing our cultural and social being, 
and the single most important item of consumption (this 
emphasises the importance of quality and control over what 
we eat, and refuses a view of food as merely nutritious fuel 
for animal bodies);
III. We can live with injustice, exploitation and corruption – but 
not if they strike us in the belly;
IV. We fear that this situation will deteriorate/see no sign of 
authoritative action;
V. From their past performance, the public authorities can act if 
so motivated; and
VI. We have the organisational means to express our collective 
discontent. 
These views are by no means inherently anti-market: markets, 
including global markets, have been liberating as well as commodifying 
for people facing rapid social and economic change. Instead, these 
are views that are critical of the tendency for unregulated markets 
to work in favour of the rich and powerful. The moral economies in 
these views are about subordinating or socialising food markets to 
serve their primary purpose of feeding people, as opposed to for 
profit (Holt-Gimenez and Patel 2012). 
Even with these conditions in place, a specific trigger tends to be 
present, a specific instance of outrage against the moral economic 
logic within which these beliefs make sense. And riots – in the sense 
of violent outbursts – tend to occur when protests are met with 
violence. 
When we say we detect a connection, a causal link between popular 
mobilisation and food policies that are reliable and fair, we are not 
saying that policymakers design policies to keep rioters happy. Of 
course this does sometimes happen, as with Mozambique’s post-
2010 ‘anti-riot exchange rate’, but we know the effects are short-
lived and weak. (For instance, the bungled attempt at subsidising 
unga in Kenya; the similarly failed effort to issue subsidised rice 
through outlets in garments factories in Bangladesh; or the basic 
basket ‘lie’ in Mozambique). We are instead saying that popular 
mobilisation reboots the moral economy, reminding policymakers 
and the public that they have rights and responsibilities. These 
ruptures can help re-establish the mandate for public authorities to 
act in crises, clarifying what is expected of them, and how. Protests 
provide a rough reckoning of the impacts of crises and of the policy 
responses to them – monitoring as voice rather than bureaucratic 
data systems. And the sheer shame of being known to have failed 
to adequately feed your population – state failure on food security 
as equivalent to the emasculating failure of the breadwinner to put 
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meals on the table – is, for most rulers, sanction enough. 
Implications
Methodological lessons
A key methodological lesson from this research is that media content, 
international and national, cannot be relied on for ‘data’ on popular 
political events like riots or protests. In our research design we had 
not fully factored in the variability and idiosyncrasies of reporting of 
such events. We concluded that national media coverage could be:
•	 closely shaped by expectations of what constituted ‘news’: in 
Kenya, coverage could be limited or events ignored because 
no official response was expected and the readership was 
presumed to be uninterested;
•	 subservient to the discourses and interests of government, 
in contexts such as Mozambique where both economic and 
political power are highly concentrated;
•	 biased against reporting rural protests;
•	 biased against particular categories or classes of protestors 
(e.g. industrial workers);
•	 biased towards reporting events featuring violence; and
•	 formulaic in their accounts with a narrow range of descriptors 
and limited direct reporting of protestors’ viewpoints.
We also found that
•	 many protests were not covered at all;
•	 protest coverage often failed to capture the material 
grievances at issue; and
•	 histories and backstories of protest campaigns or groups 
were generally absent from account. 
As most research on food riots and others protest relies heavily 
(and until the advent of social media, necessarily) on print media 
sources for simple event counts data, there are excellent reasons 
to be suspicious of the accuracy of the pictures these depict. These 
are often caricatures of more deeply-embedded protest movements 
with more strategic and thinking agendas – and more interaction 
with politics and policy – than event counts give them credit for (Tilly 
2008).
A final word on the rationale for our research: the reporting in the 
international press of food riots in (30 or more, or less, depending 
on the source) countries around the world. We conclude that 
such findings are unsafe. In our early efforts to make sense of the 
prevalence of these events in our four case study countries, we 
looked at national media content for a simple timeline of events. We 
found that our assumptions about ‘food riots’ dissolved easily into 
more complex diffuse protests and struggles around subsistence - 
neither always riots, nor always just or mainly about food.
The difference between international and national media confirmed 
the seriousness of the breach in basic governance functions 
signalled by ‘food riots’. This may be why in our initial searches of 
media content for ‘food riot’ we arrived at the conclusion that a ‘food 
riot’ almost invariably occurs elsewhere. The Bangladeshi media 
reported food riots in Nepal, Pakistan and India and further afield, 
in sub-Saharan Africa, while the Indian press labelled garments 
workers’ protests in Bangladesh food riots. When Bangladeshi 
experts told us: ‘there were no food riots here’ it seemed that they did 
so with a sense of the grave implications of such a charge. Distance 
may bring things into focus for the short-sighted, but in the longer 
view, it seems to obscure. The international press referred to food 
riots in between 30 and 60 countries (depending on the source). As 
Sneyd et al suggest, there can be significant differences in how such 
events are processed domestically and internationally, as well as 
by the actors themselves and the journalists who cover them. The 
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key point is that a ‘food riot’ is a recognisably serious charge to lay 
against a country.
‘Scaling’ the politics of provisions
The finding that the politics of provisions are functional at a national 
and sometimes subnational level, means that they are ‘mis-scaled’ 
with respect to the problems people face as a result of the globalisation 
of food. We found that even in the 21st century with its complex 
intertwined global food economy – or perhaps even because the 
forces that govern it are so abstract, distant and unknowable – the 
achievement of food security is a matter of nationhood. This drive 
reaches back into national histories: the founding myths of many 
a postcolonial state features the eradication of famine or callous 
official neglect of desperate people, often with an added layer of 
noble socialist sacrifice of eating well today in the struggle for a truly 
just tomorrow when all citizens will eat equally well. The popularity 
of food policy is ultimately tested against nationalist criteria, and 
protectionist responses to food crises predominate. Belonging to the 
imagined community of the nation implies sharing the food. 
This bears repeating first because it bears witness to the power of 
democratic political competition, at least in the popular imagination. 
Democratic transitions offer repeated, fairly regular moments in 
which to reassert food rights and responsibilities. They also offer 
opportunities to demonstrate the withdrawal of legitimacy, of assent 
to rule. It is easy and usual to be cynical about what democratic 
politics can deliver for the masses in developing countries. And 
yet in three of these countries (less so Kenya) electoral power is 
experienced as a corrective on bad food policies. People believe 
their voting behaviour matters, and that perceptions of their voting 
intentions, presumably gauged from the temperature of public 
opinion, influence policy choices – even when no party explicitly 
incorporates those choices into its policy platform.
What does the global nature of the major recent price shocks mean 
for the prospects of a politics of provisions centred on national 
identity, national institutions and national political competition? 
For Fraser, a nation-centric food politics in a global food crisis is 
necessarily on the wrong scale, inherently incapable of hitting its 
targets (Fraser 2008; Fraser 2011b; see also Engels 2014). If we 
take seriously the global nature of food systems we need to take 
seriously the need for a properly global politics of food. This means 
a world moral economy; an international right-to-food movement; a 
global response to food crises.  
Our research implies that there are several barriers here. One is 
the familiar problem of conceptualising globalisation to politicise 
a response: how to understand the causal chain between the 
commodification of global food markets and what we can afford to 
buy in our local market? The complexity of the world food regime is 
plainly a barrier to the emergence of a politics of provisions ‘scaled’ 
to the needs of global food justice, partly because attribution is 
difficult. It is not insurmountable, as the energetic effort of La Via 
Campesina to promote a global movement for food sovereignty 
shows. But some of the normative agendas of contemporary national 
and local moral economies jar with the bare facts of the international 
integration of aspects of many national food systems. There is a 
vast difference, conceptually and organisationally, between political 
action around actual physical marketplaces (e.g., ‘redistributing’ 
grain from traders’ warehouses), on the one hand, and political 
action against speculation in futures ‘markets’ for food commodities, 
on the other (Edelman 2005). This is not helped by the fact that no 
buyer and seller ever come in contact in such markets - indeed, 
no physical food grains ever actually change hands. But perhaps 
it is not necessary to understand the world to know it needs to be 
changed. It is increasingly recognised that the relationship between 
commodity speculation in food markets and food market outcomes 
is so complex that erring on the side of caution, even without robust 
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evidence of the effects of regulation, is easily the best policy (Spratt 
2013). 
A global politics of provisions may mean internationalising a moral 
economy built around nationhood and national affiliation, as well as 
politicising abstract complex global market processes. Neither of 
these is impossible and both, to different degrees, continue within 
anti-globalisation struggles such as the food sovereignty movement. 
Yet there is undeniably a delinking of local and national struggles 
at the food consumption end of the food politics spectrum from the 
more internationally-networked producer politics. We currently lack 
a functionally global food consumer movement, despite the many 
moves in this direction.
Another obstacle to re-scaling the politics of provisions is that it is not 
clear at whom protests might be aimed. One of the features of recent 
food riots is that global policymakers are generally deaf to their 
meanings, for the very good reason that they lack the sophisticated 
understanding of domestic politics they would need to make sense 
of them, as well as the electoral incentives that would sensitise 
them to popular discontent. The major players in global food policy 
spaces are predominantly international bureaucrats. Global food 
policymakers need to be able to hear – and to fear – food riots; food 
rioters need to find better ways of making them listen. This means 
political spaces in which rights claims can be made and translated 
into language that policy elites can understand – as the successes 
in shifting the discourse by the past two UN Special Rapporteurs on 
the Right to Food demonstrate.
In this, global policymaking has not always been well supported by 
either civil society organising or by international research. Research 
on ‘food riots’ has rarely amplified protestor voice, and more usually 
reduced the understanding of causes to the mechanics of price 
levels and dynamics. As already noted, organising and research on 
the rights of smallholder food producers has been more extensive 
and more effective than that on low-income consumers. These are 
not contrasted to suggest an inherent conflict of interest between 
consumers and producers; our research indicates this is over-played 
in the food policy debates, concealing the disproportionate market 
control typically enjoyed by large producers, traders and retailers. But 
the scope for identifying important shared interests around access to 
quality and affordable food across north and south, or even across 
different food cultures, seems limited. 
Aid-funded civil society groups in developing countries often avoid 
subsistence protests or food rights campaigning, partly because 
they lack links to protesting groups. Where they have engaged, this 
has sometimes, as in Mozambique, led to national NGOs’ energy 
being diverted from the struggle to mobilise a grassroots indigenous 
movement around the right to food into donor-friendly but ultimately 
fruitless ‘advocacy’, so there are good reasons to tread carefully. 
These are contentious issues, and many donor governments are 
wary of subsistence-related struggles because of their historic 
association with the left and because of their tendency to unruliness. 
Aid donors’ usual distance from contentious and unruly politics, 
as well as their investments in pro-market reforms, help to ensure 
that they and the civil society groups they fund are distanced from 
struggles over food policy. 
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Right-to-food movements represent an opportunity to engage with 
this earthier and less civil mode of mobilising, and to connect the 
global to the national and the local. Our findings suggest that riots 
and rights movements are different sides of the same coin. Some 
implications of this are that when a) there is a shared understanding 
of the moral economy and b) functional channels to express the 
precariousness of access to food, then it is possible for mobilisation 
to make a claim for the right to food. Without these two basic building 
blocks however, riots present the only option to both be heard 
and ‘correct’ the prevailing moral economy to be more sensitive 
to food justice. But as the experience of Mozambique warns, aid 
may encourage the substitution of empty ‘astro-turf’ posturing for 
the messy and difficult task of strengthening the grassroots links 
of nascent right-to-food movements, as it sets agendas by default. 
What is needed is more spaces in which right-to-food activists can 
grow and experiment, support for human rights work that can be 
flexible and politically engaged, and work with media professionals 
to raise the profile of hunger issues. These are the key lessons from 
India’s Right to Food movement, which through our research, we 
aim to share with other countries. 
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Bibliographical notes
1  (Thompson 1971; Thompson 1991; J. Bohstedt 2010; L. A. 
Tilly 1983).
2  There is by now a large literature debating (‘fatuously’, 
according to Paul Collier (Collier 2008)) the causes of the global 
food price spikes of 2008 and 2011. There is also a growing body 
of scholarship on the source and implications of the longer period 
of food price volatility and inflation of 2007-12. The causes of the 
price spikes are relevant for understanding how the global crisis 
transmitted to national food economies and the efficacy of popular 
protests, but this is not the space for an extended discussion of these 
issues, so we summarise these in our bibliographical notes. 
There exists a superficial consensus about the explanatory variables 
– in 2008, these were primarily bio-fuel investments and rising global 
demand for high value food items, while in 2011, climate-related 
events pushed prices steeply up. There is much discussion but no 
consensus on the role played by financial speculation in the food 
crises (see Ghosh, Heintz, and Pollin 2011; Ghosh 2010), reflecting 
the deeply ideological cleft in the interpretations or narratives of the 
crises. Very broadly speaking, on the left, the ‘crisis’ was a crisis 
of capitalism, rooted in the financialisation and commoditisation 
of food markets, under-investment in agriculture, unequal global 
trade regimes, the dominance of ‘technical’ pro-market solutions 
Figure 7 newspapers, including 
leFtist monthlies, are pasted on 
public noticeboards in gaibandha, 
northern bangladesh
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to political problems of distribution, policy influence, and political 
power. For many on the left, the 2008 price spike was no crisis, 
but food business as usual, with its contradictions rendered visible 
to policy elites. On the right, consistent with dominant international 
development thinking on the issue, the crisis was a moment of market 
adjustment to rising demand for meat, biofuel production incentives, 
and trade shocks. Food prices had been too low for decades, this 
was an overdue correction, albeit a dramatic one exacerbated by 
protectionist responses to popular concerns about rising prices. The 
political divisions in the literature on the food crisis are a striking 
echo of those in the literature on the ‘IMF riots’ of the 1970s and 
1980s (see the seminal account by Walton and Seddon 2008).
Some of the more interesting analyses emphasise: broader, possibly 
predictable cyclical factors in world food trade (Timmer 2010); 
idiosyncratic trade shocks (Derek Headey 2011); agricultural under-
investment leading to food import dependence (Clapp 2009); the 
short-term effects of longer-term agrarian change (Deborah Fahy 
Bryceson 2009) and of emergent food systems stresses (Lang 
2010). For an account of the crisis that uses food regime analysis to 
place food-agriculture systems within the global capitalist economy 
(and therefore sees the strains and contradictions as intrinsic) 
see (McMichael 2009). Other helpful overviews of the global crisis 
and the period of price volatility and rising prices that followed are 
(Gilbert and Morgan 2010; Naylor and Falcon 2010; Von Braun and 
Gebreyohanes 2012; FAO 2009). 
3  The idea that the 2008 food shock was part of a ‘perfect storm’ 
conveys the apocalyptic and Malthusian nature of the discourse of the 
time (Beddington 2009; Derek Headey, Malaiyandi, and Fan 2010; 
Held, Kaldor, and Quah 2010). Yet a consensus has increasingly 
emerged that the impact was probably more short-lived and dramatic 
than it was enduringly adverse for the people most affected. See 
for instance (Compton, Wiggins, and Keats; World Bank 2012; D. 
Headey 2013). In particular, rural incomes, even for some of the 
poor, have risen at least in some places, above inflation, leaving 
surplus farmers definitely and others possibly, better off (Swinnen 
2011). Beyond the bare nutritional and income-consumption effects 
of the food price rises –largely positive for rural surplus farmers 
and typically negative, in the short-term, for low income urban folk 
– food price rises had longer-term adverse implications for human 
wellbeing, social organisation and gender relations (Heltberg et al. 
2012; N. Hossain, King, and Kelbert 2013).
On the food riots of 2008 and related subsistence protests of 2011, 
there are a number of event catalogues (Schneider 2008; Ortiz et 
al. 2013). One recent paper has situated the 2008 protests within 
a longer historical sweep, making it possible to see the continuities 
and departures of the period 2007—12 (John Bohstedt 2014). A 
strand of political economy analysis situates the protests within the 
wider food regime and popular movements for food sovereignty and 
food rights (Patel and McMichael 2009), while others look to wider 
struggles for economic justice and security (Bush 2010; O’Brien 
2012; Hossain 2009). The most prominent strand of the literature 
from the economics discipline undertakes cross-country analysis 
to establish causes (or correlates) of protests, confirming that such 
events are associated with price spikes and a lack of alternative 
means of articulating discontent (i.e. non-democratic regimes; 
(Berazneva and Lee 2013; Arezki and Bruckner 2011; Hendrix, 
Haggard, and Magaloni 2009; Verpoorten and Arora 2011). See also 
(Lagi, Bertrand, and Bar-Yam 2011) for an account that locates the 
triggers of the Middle Eastern ‘spring’ in the food crisis. One study 
concludes that rising prices, not volatility per se, are associated with 
riots (Bellemare 2011). More recently, studies have looked closely at 
the protests, comparing reportage with participants’ own views to get 
a more richly textured picture (Sneyd, Legwegoh, and Fraser 2013; 
Engels 2014). 
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4  Our early thinking on ‘unruly politics’ is summarised by 
our colleague (Khanna 2012). On contractarian approaches to the 
politics of social protection, see (Hickey 2011).
5  The seminal work on the moral economy as the theory for 
food rioters remains E. P. Thompson’s work on 18th century England 
(Thompson 1971; Thompson 1991). Our thinking has also been 
influenced by more contemporary uses of the concept, for instance 
in relation to transnational organising (Hickey 2011). See (Naomi 
Hossain and Kalita 2014) for more on how we have been thinking 
about the moral economy in the contemporary period.
6  This is what Dani Rodrik termed the globalization ‘trilemma’ 
– how can countries be democratic, determine their own national 
economic policies, while also remaining part of a global economy? 
(Rodrik 2011).
7  The photographic record by the Reuters’ photographer 
Andrew Biraj highlights the frontline role of women in the struggles. 
See http://www.chipp.cn/2011-03/24/content_10951.htm [accessed 
30th September 2014].
8  (“DEVELOPMENT: If There’s No Rice, Let Them Eat Potatoes 
| Inter Press Service” 2014). http://www.ipsnews.net/2008/04/
development-if-there39s-no-rice-let-them-eat-potatoes/ [accessed 
1st October 2014]. 
9  For instance, research has indicated that between 30 and 50 
per cent of the wheat price spike and between 45 and 100 per cent 
of the rice price spike can be attributed to export bans (see Baltzer 
2013; Martin and Anderson 2012; Derek Headey and Shenggen Fan 
2010).
10  This framework is developed in more detail in (King et al. 
2014).
11  Dr Marie Jo Cortijo, personal communication.
12  The classic account of elite paranoia about external 
involvement in domestic protests being Rude’s account of the French 
and English 18th and 19th century crowd. See (Rudé 1981).
13 Not surprisingly, we were unable to get official confirmation 
of this interesting policy response. But if true, it says 
something powerful about the priorities of the Government of 
Bangladesh, and its willingness to sacrifice border controls 
for lower prices.
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